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Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the 
Staged Arrest 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 1, 1973, in the Criminal Court of the City of 
New York, Kings County, Stephen Vitale was arraigned on a 
charge of armed robbery. According to the complaining wit- 
ness, Morton Hirsch, Vitale placed a pistol against Hirsch's 
head, threatened him, and robbed him of over $8,000. The sup- 
porting affidavit of Police Officer Brian Cosgrove stated that as 
Vitale was fleeing hom the robbery scene, Cosgove arrested 
him and seized a pistol from him.1 
On the surface, this proceeding appeared no different from 
thousands of similar proceedings taking place daily in criminal 
courts throughout the country. In fact, Vitale, Hirsch, and Cos- 
grove were undercover agents; New York's Special Anti-Cor- 
ruption Prosecutor had authorized their activities2 as part of a 
program to detect corruption in the criminal justice system.3 
False court documents, false statements made to judges, and 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author 
wishes to thank Professor Judith S. Koffler for her critical suggestions. This 
Article is dedicated to Dean Robert B. Fleming. 
1. People v. Vitale, No. K340266 (Crim. Ct. of New York City, Kings 
County, N.Y. Nov. 1,1973). 
2. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 ADSd 343,344-45,362 N.Y.S.2d 513,51415 (1974), 
afd, 36 N.Y.2d 421,330 N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
3. Pursuant to an executive order of the Governor of New York State, a 
special prosecutor was appointed to investigate corruption in the New York 
City criminal justice system. N.Y.  AD^. CODE tit. 9, $3 1.551.59 (1972). This 
action was prompted, in part, by the Commission to Investigate Negations of 
Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, popularly known 
as the "Knapp Commission," which recommended the appointment of a special 
and independent prosecuting attorney who would not be subject to the inher- 
ent limitations on local prosecutors, including dependence on the police in or- 
der to prosecute effectively. COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF 
POLICE CORRUPTION A D THE Cm's  ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, THE KNAPP 
COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 13-16 (1972) (hereinafter cited as 
KNAPP REPORT). 
The author of this Article served from 1973-1976 as a Special Assistant At- 
torney General in the oilice of the Special Prosecutor of the State of New York. 
In that capacity, he investigated and prosecuted numerous corruption cases. 
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false testimony given to a grand jury provided the staged arrest 
with "legitimacy."4 As a result of this investigation, undercover 
agents obtained evidence implicating three judges and two de- 
fense attorneys in a corrupt scheme to affect legal proceedings 
in the Vitale case.= 
The efforts to prosecute these allegedly corrupt officials re- 
sulted in swift and resounding judicial condemnation of the 
state's undercover procedure. In Rao v. Nadjari,6 a federal 
court labeled the prosecutor's conduct "foul, illegal and outra- 
geous."7 Echoing this shock, a state appellate court in Nigrone 
v. Murtagh8 declared that "[sluch a perversion of the criminal 
justice system by an overzealous prosecutor is illegal, outra- 
geous and intolerable and we condemn it."9 The latter court 
quoted the celebrated dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead 
v. United States:lo 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to 
the citizen . . . . Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become 
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis- 
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that 
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction 
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against this 
One of the principal issues that he litigated for that office was the propriety of 
the staged arrest technique, the subject of this Article. 
There has been a dramatic increase from 1970 to 1978 in the prosecution 
and conviction of federal and state public officials for crimes involving corrupt 
activities. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, F DERAL F'ROSEC~ONS OF CORRUPT PUB- 
LIC OFFICIALS 1970-1978 (1979). There does not appear to be any separate statis- 
tical study on comption in the court system. There is no reason to expect, 
however, that corruption in the court system is any less pervasive than conup- 
tion in other branches of government. The author's experience as a prosecutor 
reinforces this belief. 
For literature on the subject of corruption, see Judicial Discipline and Ten- 
ure: Hearings on S. 295, S. 522, & s .  678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements 
in Judicial Machinery and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate 
Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); KNAPP REPORT, supra, at 
15, 187; J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1980); R. CONDON, OPERATIONAL GUIDE 
TO WHITE-COLLAR C R ~ E  ENFORCEMENT, MANAGING INVESTIGATION INT  PUBLIC 
CORRUP~ION (1977); R LYMAN, W. FLETCHER & J. GARDNER, PREVENTION, DETEC- 
TION AND CORRECTION OF CORRUPTION (1977); G. NAFTALIS, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIMES (1980). 
4. Nig&ne v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343,347,362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1974). 
5. See Brief for Res~ondent at  7.13. Nierone v. Murtaeh. 36 N.Y.2d 421.330 
. , -  u ,  , ~~ 
N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
6. No. 75 Civ. 2376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,1975). 
7. Id. See Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,1975). 
8. 46 A.D.2d 343,362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), a p d ,  36 N.Y.2d 421,330 N.E.2d 45, 
369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
9. 46 A.D.2d at 347,362 N.Y.S.2d at 517. 
10. 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.11 
In contrast to the above condemnation, the courts tradition- 
ally have condoned the use of undercover techniques against 
private citizens when they involved both deception and partici- 
pation in serious offenses, such as narcotics offenses, because 
these techniques are practically indispensable to crime detec- 
tion.12 Such crimes are usually conducted covertly. There are 
no L'victims" to complain to law enforcement officials, and there 
is little tangible evidence of past unlawful activity. In the nar- 
cotics area, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that "law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only 
practicable means of detection: the Mtration of drug rings 
and a limited participation in their unlawful present 
practices."13 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the experienced law enforce- 
ment officials who directed the Vitale case concluded that it 
was permissible to expose corruption in the well-insulated and 
procedurally complex system of justice by penetrating that sys- 
tem with a contrived case involving an undercover agent posing 
as a defendant9 They believed that a realistic and effective in- 
vestigation was possible only if they fabricated a criminal case 
and shepherded it through the various stages in the justice sys- 
tem. With the sham arrest as bait, and with the investigators' 
careful monitoring of the case, an act of corruption could be 
detected. 
In part I& this Article discusses the relatively spare and un- 
settled case law relating to the staged arrest, reflected prima- 
rily in United States v. Archer15 and Nigrone v. Murtagh.16 Part 
11. 46 A.D.2d at 348,362 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18. 
12. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495-96 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,432 (1973). 
13. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. One may argue that there is a 
similar need for undercover techniques in investigations of judicial corruption. 
See notes 297-99 injea and accompanying text. , 
14. Brief for Respondent at 6, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421,330 N.E.2d 
45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
15. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). 
16. 46 A.D.2d 343,362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), a f d ,  36 N.Y.2d 421,330 N.E.2d 34, 
369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). Aside from these two cases, there has been virtually no 
critical commentary or scholarly analysis of this investigative procedure, its re- 
lation to the doctrine of entrapment, or its illumination of the need for greater 
judicial control over investigative methods that the courts find offensive and 
unfair. The absence of significant legal analysis in this area is surprising, for 
while such an undercover operation admittedly is imaginative, innovative, and 
controversial, its use parallels other investigative techniques that recently have 
proven effective and successful in discovering corruption at other levels of gov- 
ernment. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982); 
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111 of this Article examines the defense of entrapment, one of 
the most confusing and controversial legal doctrines, and its 
application to the staged arrest. Because the staged arrest in- 
eluctably raises questions of offensive government conduct that 
neither constitutes unlawful entrapment nor invades any in- 
dependent rights of citizens, part IV considers the analysis of 
courts that have invoked the due process clause to limit gov- 
ernment investigations. In view of the failure of these courts to 
provide any meaningful due process standards to control police 
undercover practices, part V sets out objective criteria helpful 
in evaluating the due process implications of undercover proce- 
dures in general, and the staged arrest in particular. Finally, 
part VI proposes, as a safeguard against government abuse of 
power, a procedure similar to the warrant procedure for ob- 
taining judicial authorization to conduct certain types of under- 
cover investigations, in this instance a "staged arrest warrant." 
11. THE STAGED ARREST: CASE LAW 
When a federal prosecutor and a state prosecutor em- 
ployed the simulated arrest during two unrelated government 
investigations into the criminal justice system in New York 
City, both investigations resulted in criminal prosecutions. In 
United States v. Amher, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed the convictions of three defendants-* prose- 
cutor, a defense attorney, and a bail bond agent-for violations 
of the Federal "Travel Act"l7 on the ground that the evidence 
was insufficient to show that the defendants used federal inter- 
state facilities to commit the offenses of bribery and conspir- 
acy.18 Thereafter, a state grand jury indicted the same 
defendants for violations of state bribery and conspiracy laws.19 
Their convictions were af3rmed on appeal over claims that the 
text accompanying notes 248-56 in&&. Hence, legal analysis directed at the 
staged arrest would be extremely valuable in assessing the lawfulness of other 
types of creative and controversial law enforcement operations. 
17. 18 U.S.C. 8 1952 (1976). The so-called "Travel Act," entitled "Interstate 
and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises," in 
substance prohibits the use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce to 
commit or promote "unlawful activity," defined to include offenses involving 
gambling, avoidance of liquor taxation, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, brib- 
ery, or arson. 
18. 486 F.2d 670,672 (2d Cir. 1973). 
19. Klein v. Murtagh, 44 ADdd 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622, a f d ,  34 N.Y.2d 988, 
318 N.E.2d 606,360 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974) (court refused to dismiss the indictment 
on the grounds of double jeopardy). 
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use of the staged arrest technique barred prosecution.20 
In the aftermath of United States v. Archer-perhaps upon 
a suggestion contained in that opinion2l-a New York State 
prosecutor used the same investigative procedure to M t r a t e  
the justice system. As a result, three defendants-a judge and 
two lawyers-were indicted for perjury. In Nigrone v. Murtagh, 
an appellate court scathingly condemned the use of the staged 
arrest.= A majority, however, found that the perjury was in- 
dependent of the misconduct and denied the motions to dis- 
miss the indictments.23 
The staged arrest was conceived in February, 1972, as part 
of an intensive combined federal and local investigation into 
. corruption within the New York criminal justice system.24 Fed- 
eral prosecutors had reportedly received "abundant informa- 
tion about the widespread fixing of cases in the Queen's 
County District Attorney's of3ceW25 and believed that it was es- 
sential to arrange undercover penetration of corrupt 
activities.26 
According to the scheme,27 a federal narcotics agent named 
Sante Bario assumed the name of Salvatore Barone and posed 
as a resident alien and member of the Las Vegas underworld. 
Arrested and charged with the illegal possession of two hand- 
guns,28 Bario met a bail bond agent named Wasserberger, who, 
in turn, introduced Bario to a Queens attorney named Klein.29 
20. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441,417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979), afd, 49 N.Y.2d 
978,406 N.E.2d 804,428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). 
21. 468 F.2d at 672 n.1 ("A special prosecutor has since been named by the 
Governor of New York to investigate precisely the kind of corruption in offlces 
of New York City district attorneys at which the federal prosecutor's activities 
here were aimed."). 
22. 46 A.D.2d 343, 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516-17 (1974), afd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 
330 N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
23. Id. at 348,362 N.Y.S.2d at 518. 
24. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 672. 
25. Id. at 683. (on petition for rehearing). 
26. Id. at 672. 
27. Id. at 672-74. 
28. Provided with two loaded pistols, a fake Nevada driver's license, and a 
false immigration card, Bario was arrested by a New York City police offlcer 
assigned to the investigation. Id. 
29. Wasserberger told Bario that he knew a Queens attorney named Frank 
Klein, with " 'big connections,' " who could " 'do something' " for Bario. Was- 
serberger said that it was unfortunate that the case was going before the grand 
jury because '"it could have been taken care of before the lower court'" and 
that they should try to "'get the case kicked out before it went any further.'" 
Id. at 673. 
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Wasserberger and Klein, together with the Queens assistant 
district attorney Norman Archer,so fabricated a story to justify 
Bario's possession of the guns.31 Klein told Bario that the price 
for this fix was $15,000, which Bario paid in marked bills.32 
After a dress rehearsal in Klein's office, Bario went before 
the grand jury and, guided by leading questions from Archer, 
told his story. Prior to deliberations, Archer minimized the se- 
riousness of Bario's offense and advised the grand jury, un- 
truthfully, that the arresting officer's observations might have 
been insufficient to justify the arrest. The grand jury returned 
no indictment.33 
Klein, Archer, and Wasserberger were ultimately convicted 
of violating the Federal Travel Act by utilizing interstate facili- 
ties to commit unlawful activities.34 The court of appeals, how- 
ever, reversed on the narrow ground of insufficient proof.35 
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Friendly went beyond 
this narrow ground to criticize, in dicta, the prosecution's un- 
dercover techniques. "We do not at all share the Government's 
30. Klein advised Bario that, under the circumstances, "'the only thing 
then left to do was to have the grand jury return no indictment'" but that this 
would cost money-" 'probably between $10,000 and $15,000 in cash! " Wasser- 
berger later informed Bario that part of the money would have to go to the 
Queens assistant district attorney who would present the case to the grand 
jury. Id. 
31. The three men concocted a story whereby Bario would testify that he 
worked for a Las Vegas hotel and was obliged to carry a pistol, for which he 
had a Nevada license. Id. at 674 
32. Id. 
33. Bario claimed that he was unaware that the Nevada license was invalid 
in New York. When one of the grand jurors asked Archer whether he had veri- 
fied the existence of the Nevada pistol permit, Archer responded that he had. 
Id. 
34. The predicate for federal jurisdiction was three telephone calls: a call 
from Klein returning a call fkom Bario in Newark, New Jersey; unsuccessful at- 
tempts by Wasserberger to reach Bario in Las Vegasj and a call to Klein from 
Bario from Paris. Id. at 673-74. 
35. Id. at 672. The court found that the three telephone calls were "insufE- 
cient to transform this sordid, federally provoked incident of local corruption 
into a crime against the United States." Id. at 683. The court concluded that 
Klein's return calls to Bario were outside the purview of the federal act be- 
cause the communication was "totally fabricated" by the government. Id. at 
681. Wasserberger's calls to Las Vegas also were 'provoked" by the govern- 
ment and, moreover, could not have promoted any unlawful activity since Bario 
merely used the hotel number as a ruse and was not a guest there. Id. at 682. 
Finally, leaving open the question of whether a call from an undercover agent 
can ever meet the requirement of the Act, the Court said that the Paris call 
from Bario was a casual occurrence; a call from New York could have served its 
purpose equally well. Id. at 682-83. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 
(1971); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 
(1969). 
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pride in its achievement of causing the bribery of a state assis- 
tant district attorney by a scheme which involved lying to New 
York police officers and perjury before New York judges and 
grand jurors; the federal prosecutor . . . went beyond any 
proper prosecutorial role,"36 and "authorized [agents] to en- 
gage in crimes under New York law."37 
Since the government had not implanted the criminal de- 
sign in the minds of the defendants, Judge Friendly concluded 
that they could not raise the defense of entrapment. But a judi- 
cial rebuke for the undercover tactics employed in Archer was 
nonetheless apparent. Judge Friendly went on to distinguish 
this case from the typical federal narcotics undercover investi- 
gation, in which agents posing as prospective purchasers in- 
duce a sale of drugs.38 According to Friendly, government 
agents in a narcotics investigation do not commit independent 
crimes of their own.39 In Archer, however, government agents 
did commit crimes independent of the criminal acts for which 
the defendants were prosecuted.40 In conclusion, Judge 
Friendly observed: "[TI here is certainly a limit to allowing gov- 
ernmental involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for 
example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies 
and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other mem- 
bers of a gang of hoodlums."41 
The Archer case provided no sound basis for its criticism of 
the staged arrest. The court did not discuss the apparent ne- 
cessity for undercover penetration of the justice system.42 It 
did not propose alternative procedures, nor did it say whether 
it would accept some limited use of a staged arrest technique.43 
Moreover, the court neither discussed nor attempted to balance 
the competing harms. It did not evaluate the complex and seri- 
ous problem of corruption in the justice system-starkly dram- 
atized by the conduct of the Archer conspirators.~ Nor did it 
36. 486 F.2d at 672. 
37. Id. at 675. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 675-76. 
40. Id. at 675. The court is presumably referring to the offenses of criminal 
possession of a weapon, N.Y. PENAL AW $5 265.01-265.04 (McKinney 1974); per- 
jury in the first degree, N.Y. PENAL AW 8 210.15 (McKinney 1965); and offering 
a false instrument for filing in the first degree, N.Y. PENAL AW 5 175.35 (McKin- 
ney 1965). 
41. 486 F.2d at 676-77. Judge Friendly relied on language in United States 
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), one of the principal entrapment decisions. 
42. See text accompanying notes 288-90 infia. 
43. See text accompanying notes 289-90 infia. 
44. Although the seriousness of the problem would not alone justify any 
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explain or examine its assumption that the deception by gov- 
ernment agents necessarily constituted an adverse conse- 
quence or harm to society.45 More specifically, the court, in its 
broad remonstrances directed at governmental law breaking, 
did not identify the substance of the crimes allegedly commit- 
ted, or suggest whether they were evils or mere technicalities.46 
The court also failed to analyze satisfactorily whether the un- 
dercover agent possessed a culpable mental state, or mens rea, 
traditionally required for criminal behavior.47 In sum, the court 
in Archer displayed a visceral repugnance for the conduct of 
the law enforcement omcials--conduct that clearly shocked its 
conscience--without providing a well-reasoned basis for its 
conclusion. 
In the state proceedings that followed the dismissal of the 
federal indictment, Archer was found guilty of receiving a 
bribe.48 On appeal, the reviewing court afRrmed his conviction, 
holding that the staged arrest procedure violated neither due 
process nor a sense of justice.49 
The court, noting that Archer never claimed that he was 
entrapped or that he was an unwilling participant in the 
type of law enforcement response, it is a factor that one must consider in bal- 
ancing the harm caused by the crime against the harm, if any, caused by the 
government's conduct. The government made this argument, but the court did 
not elaborate upon it. See 486 F.2d at 677 n.8. 
45. There surely is a considerable difference between government agents 
robbing and beating innocent civilians to gather evidence against a gang of 
muggers-the court's vivid illustration-and the unspecified harm to the justice 
system that allegedly occurred in Archer. Although the court acknowledged 
different levels of offensiveness of government conduct, id. at 676, it did not ex- 
plain how one can measure or discover such differences. See text accompany- 
ing notes 355-62 inzfra. 
46. See text accompanying notes 301-20 inzfra. 
47. The court did suggest that governmental participation in narcotics of- 
fenses is distinguishable from governmental participation in staged arrests be- 
cause in the former case the government agent has "no criminal intent." 486 
F.2d at 675. The court's assertion, however, was conclusory, and did not suggest 
why criminal intent is lacking in narcotics cases but is present in Archer. 
48. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441,417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979), afd, 49 N.Y.2d 
978, 406 N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). A prior 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied. See Klein v. Mur- 
tagh, 44 A.D.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622, afd, 34 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360 
N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974). 
As a result of a pretrial "investigative technique hearing," the reviewing 
court had a more complete record on the issue of governmental misconduct. 
People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d at 446,417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
49. People v. Archer, 68 kD.2d at 449,417 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
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scheme,so did not consider those defenses. Instead, it analyzed 
the case under the due process clause of the state constitution, 
which "imposes higher standards on police conduct" than fed- 
eral due process standards.51 Under a state due process analy- 
sis, the court considered the following four factors: whether 
the government "manufactured a crime which otherwise would 
not likely have occurred," or merely involved itself in ongoing 
criminal activity; whether the defendant's reluctance or unwill- 
ingness to commit the crime was overcome by appeals to hu- 
manitarian instincts such as sympathy, past friendship, 
temptation of exhorbitant gain, or persistent solicitation; 
whether the government's motive was "simply a desire to ob- 
tain a conviction" rather than 'Yo prevent further crime or pro- 
tect the populace;" and whether the government engaged in 
"criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of jus- 
tice."sz In considering these factors, the court said that it 
would focus on the overriding law enforcement objective of 
crime prevention rather than on the officials' possible "encour- 
agement of and participation in sheer lawlessness."~3 
Applying these factors to Archer's case, the court deter- 
mined that no due process violation had occurred. First, the 
government did not manufacture a crime that would not likely 
have occurred because the defendants 5vere engaged in ongo- 
ing criminal activity long prior to the appearance on the scene 
of the government agent."% In addition, Archer was not in- 
volved because of any temptation, inducement, or instigation 
by the government. The attorney Klein independently brought 
Archer into the conspiracy as the central figure in the flx.55 
Furthermore, the government acted in good faith and not for 
venal reasons.56 Finally, the government did not commit 
crimes57 or engage in improper conduct inconsistent with a 
50. Id. at 447,417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
51. Id. at 446, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, 8 6 ("No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."). See 
generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individuul Rights, 
90 HAW. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
52. 68 A.D.2d at 44647,417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
53. Id. (quoting People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,521,378 N.E.2d 78,83,406 
N.Y.S.2d 714,719 (1978)). 
54. 68 A.D.2d at 447,417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
55. Id. 
56. According to the court, "the record conclusively establishes that the 
government's motivation in this affair was to weed out existing corruption and 
restore the integrity of the criminal justice system in Queens County." Id. at 
447,417 N.Y.S.2d at 511-512. 
57. Although "taken literally," the government's conduct "could well fall, 
prima facie, within the prohibitions of our Penal Law," such conduct, even if 
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sense of justice. The court found that the government tried to 
limit its deception to the minimum extent necessary, and con- 
veyed the plan in advance to the highest-ranking state judge. 
Furthermore, the deception of the grand jury was planned and 
engineered by the conspirators themselves, not by the govern- 
ment? In sum, while cautioning that it might be wiser to de- 
velop judicial guidelines to circumscribe such deception, the 
court found that the conduct of the law enforcement offlcials 
was not improper.59 
The state court's analysis of the staged arrest was more so- 
technically criminal, was justified as a "reasonable exercise of [the govern- 
ment's] offlcial powers, duties or functions!' Id. at 448,417 N.Y.S.2d at 512. The 
court referred to N.Y. PENAL LAW $35.05 (McKinney 1975) which provides: 
"[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not 
criminal when: . . . [sluch conduct is required or authorized by law or by a ju- 
dicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of 
his offlcial powers, duties or functions." The Practice Commentary states that 
the provision "as designed to exempt peace offlcers and other public servants 
from criminal liability for conduct reasonably performed by them in the course 
of their duties . . . such as possession of narcotics, policy slips and tear gas!' 
Hechtman, Practice Commentaries to N.Y. PENAL LAW $ 35.05 (McKinney 1975). 
See People v. Mattison, 75 A.D.2d 959,428 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1980). 
Eighteen states in addition to New YO& have included law enforcement 
justification statutes in their criminal codes. See ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 41-503 
(1975); Cow. REV. STAT. $ 18-1-701 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. $ 53a-17 (1977)s 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,s 704.11 (1979); GA. CODE 8 26901(b) (1978); HAWAII REV. 
STAT. $ 703-307 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. $ 411 (West 1979); KY. REV. STAT. 
$ 503.040 (1975); LA REV. STAT. ANN. $ 1418(1) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17a, $102 (Pamphlet 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 627.5 (1974); N.D. CENT. 
CODE $ 12.1-05-02 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 2901.05(c) (2) (Page Special 
Supp. 1973); OR. REV. STAT. $ 161.195 (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. $504 (Pur- 
don 1973); TEX PENAL CODE ANN. $ 9.21 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. $ 76-2- 
401(2) (1978); WE. STAT. $ 939.45 (1979). 
The Model Penal Code also includes such a provision. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE $ 3.03 (Proposed Offlcial Draft 1962). 
58. According to the court, this deception "constituted the very means" by 
which the defendants carried out the crime. 68 A.D.2d at 448, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 
512. 
59. Id. at 449, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13. Following this affirmance, the New 
York Court of Appeals also affirmed the defendant's conviction. See People v. 
Archer, 49 N.Y.2d 978,406 N.E.2d 804,428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 
(1980). Archer then flled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the 
prosecutorial action constituting the basis for his conviction had violated due 
process. The district court denied the petition without opinion, and the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Archer v. Commissioner of Correc- 
tion, 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981). The circuit court noted that in cases where con- 
victions were reversed because of outrageous police conduct, "the 
impermissible police conduct was inflicted directly upon the defendant." Id. at 
47. The court expressly left open the question of whether conduct of law en- 
forcement offlcials not inflicted directly upon the defendant--as in Archer's 
case-might be outrageous enough to constitute a denial of due process. Id. In 
any event, "the conduct here at issue did not reach that leveLn Id. 
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phisticated than that of the Second Circuit. Rather than 
merely reacting negatively to the investigators' techniques, the 
court attempted to establish meaningful criteria to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the investigators' actions. Although it did 
not elaborate on its suggestion of developing "judicial guide- 
lines," its criteria provide guidelines in formulating an objective 
due process analysis.60 
The undercover operation in Nigrone v. Murtagh was trig- 
gered by an individual who claimed he dealt directly with a 
member of the judiciary to "fix" a criminal case in New York 
City.61 The New York Special Prosecutor decided to investi- 
gate by inliltrating the'court system with a sham case. A police 
officer, using the alias "Stephen Vitale," stole approximately 
$8,200 in cash from a businessman, at gunpoint.= Vitale was 
charged, arrested, and released upon paying his bail of $10,000, 
set by a judge unaware of the charade.63 
The prosecutor engaged another undercover agent, Mrs. 
Gatti, to contact United States Customs Court Judge Paul R. 
Rao, an old family friend, to enlist his help for Vitale, repre- 
senting that Vitale was the son of "dear friends." Judge Rao 
told 1Mrs. Gatti that the best way to handle the matter was to 
obtain a lawyer who "knew the judge" in the case. Judge Rao 
recommended his son, Paul Rao, Jr., a practicing attorney. 
Gatti immediately contacted Rao, Jr., who agreed to represent 
Vitale. Rao, Jr., helped Vitale prepare a phony story about how 
he raised the $10,000 cash bail; advised Vitale that he would 
need money to "talk to" certain people who could help 
"squash" Vitale's case; discussed Vitale's case with a civil court 
judge, who in turn apprised a superior court judge that there 
was money to be made in the Vitale case; and informed his law 
partner, Salvatore Nigrone, that "the hook was in" (a euphe- 
60. See notes 229-35 infia and accompanying text. 
61. See Brief for Respondent at  12, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421,330 
N.Eld 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). The court did not dispute that "allegedly spe- 
cific information about corruption in the criminal justice system" stimulated 
the use of the technique. 46 A.D.2d at 344,362 N.Y.S.2d a t  514. 
62. See notes 1-5 mpra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 
facts in the case, see Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343,34446,362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 
513-16 (1974). See also Brief for Respondent a t  6, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 
421,330 N.ESd 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
63. The prosecutor's oBce also contrived a false criminal record for Vitale, 
indicating that he had two prior arrests. 46 kD.2d a t  345,362 N.Y.S.2d a t  515. 
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mism for a "fix") in the Vitale case.64 
A grand jury subsequently indicted Vitale. Neither the 
prosecutor presenting the evidence to the grand jury nor the 
grand jurors were aware that the story was a fabrication and 
that no actual robbery had occurred. A special anticorruption 
grand jury then was convened. In testifying before that special 
grand jury, the defendants lied about their prior activities.65 
Perjury indictments against Rao, Rao, Jr., and Nigrone fol- 
lowed. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictments on 
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, urging specifically that 
the prosecutor committed criminal acts and disgraced the crim- 
inal process. The appellate division, which sustained the in- 
dictments, nevertheless unanimously concurred that the 
prosecutor had committed serious misconduct.66 
64. Id. at 34446,362 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16. 
65. The Raos and Nigrone waived immunity and testified to their knowl- 
edge and participation in the %" Their perjury became apparent when the 
prosecutor introduced into evidence several incriminating conversations that 
the government had surreptitiously taped and recorded. Id. at 346,362 N.Y.S.2d 
at 516. 
Judge Rao was indicted on two counts of perjury in the first degree for de- 
nying that he ever told Gatti (1) how to handle her problem in affecting a 
judge's actions in a criminal case; and (2) that the bail problem could be han- 
dled by getting a lawyer who knew the judge. Record on Appeal at 126-31, 
Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421,330 N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
Rao, Jr., was indicted on seven counts of pejury in the first degree for de- 
nying (1) that he had ever told Vitale that he would have to get money so that 
he would "know how to talk" to other people who could question his case; 
(2) that he had seen a judge, other than the judge presiding in the case, about 
the Vitale case; (3) that he had ever seen anyone in the court system to obtain 
assistance in the Vitale case; (4) that he had ever discussed with Vitale or any- 
one else whether a "hook was in" in the Vitale case; (5) that he helped create a 
"phony" story or defense for Vitale; (6) that he had no knowledge that the bail 
money was the proceeds of the robbery; and (7) that Vitale had never told him 
that his parents had not furnished the bail. Id. at 164-80. 
Nigrone was indicted on one count of pejury in the &st degree for testify- 
ing that he had never asked Rao, Jr., if the "hook was in" in the Vitale case. Id. 
at 112-14 
66. The court wrote: 
There is no doubt whatsoever that, upon the facts here presented, 
the office of Special Prosecutor has exceeded its proper pmsecutorial 
function. The deception of grand jurors, Judges and Assistant District 
Attorneys and the filing of false official documents are absolutely intol- 
erable. The criminal justice system operates to protect the individual 
from both unsubstantiated accusations of guilt and illegal or outra- 
geous conduct by an overreaching prosecutor. It is an impartial arbiter, 
exercising its judgment, for the most part, after law enforcement au- 
thorities have completed their function of detecting crime and appre- 
hending the alleged criminal. When, as here, the criminal justice 
system is made an unwitting accomplice of an overzealous prosecutor, 
before the fact, its impartiality is destroyed and contempt for the law 
encouraged. 
46 A.D.2d at 347,362 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17. 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 578 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 2  
19821 STAGED ARRESTS 579 
The court objected most to the presentation of the fictitious 
case to the grand jury, since the purpose was not for a determi- 
nation of whether Vitale had committed a crime or to exoner- 
ate him of an accusation, but rather to legitimize his 
undercover role as a criminal facing prosecution, and to allow 
the defendants to influence the case corruptly.67 Having 
broadly condemned the misconduct of the prosecutor,68 how- 
ever, a majority of the court held that the perjury indictments 
were valid.69 Given the important public interest in uncovering 
corruption, and the corresponding duty of all citizens to assist 
the grand jury in arriving at the truth, ''[nlo person called 
before a duly constituted Grand Jury may be permitted to have 
any excuse to lie."70 Moreover, the court did not find the case 
so egregious that it violated due process. The prosecutor 
neither manufactured nor participated in the defendants' per- 
jury. Although he induced them to commit bribery, "that con- 
duct was negligible once the Special Grand Jury entered the 
picture. It was then that a new and independent inexcusable 
wrong was allegedly committed."?l 
The two dissenting judges shared the majority's outrage at 
the "Javert type techniques" of the prosecutor, particularly his 
"profanation of the sacred institution-the Grand Jury."72 The 
dissent catalogued at least ten crimes that the prosecutor may 
have committed,73 and criticized the prosecutor's motive in 
67. Id. at 347,362 N.Y.SZd at 517. The court felt that such a misuse of the 
justice system was "illegal, outrageous and intolerable." Id. 
68. The court noted that "[ilf the justice system is to have any usefulness, 
it must be respected and believed. The necessary con5dence cannot be pre- 
served when Grand Juries and Judges are duped in charades composed of lies 
and deceptions fabricated by the law ofecers of the State." Id. 
69. Id. at 348,362 N.Y.SZd at 518. 
70. Id. at 348-49,362 N.Y.S.2d at 518. 
71. Id. at 350, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 519. Noting that the defendants never 
claimed they were illegally entrapped, or that the government violated any of 
their personal constitutional rights, the court refused to extend the exclusion- 
ary rule. See Wong Sun v. United States, 372 U.S. 471 (1963). 
72. 46 A.D.2d at 355,359,362 N.Y.S.2d at 524,528. For a history of the grand 
jury, see 1 J. C-, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON TRE C ~ A L  LAW 305-24 (5th 
Am. ed. 1847); 1 W. HOLDSWOR~, HISTORY OF rn ENGLISH LAW 321-23 (7th rev. 
ed. 1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. -, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151 (2d 
ed. 1901). For a history of the grand jury in America, see R YOUNGER, THE PEO- 
PLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 16341941 (1963). 
Modern commentators, however, have viewed the grand jury as a legal 
fiction, clothing with respectability, neutrality, and independence-what are-in 
truth the actions of the  rosec cut or. See M. FRANKEL & G. N m m .  THE GRAND 
JURY 21-23 (1977). See also Gershman, 2% ''Pe&+y l'!wp,'' 129 u.' PA. L. REV. 
624,630-33 (1981). 
73. 46 A.D.2d at 352, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The alleged crimes included per- 
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summoning the defendants before the grand jury.74 The dis- 
senters, however, unlike the majority, would have dismissed 
the indictments. Quoting from Rochin v. Calijornia,75 a case in 
which the Supreme Court reversed, on due process grounds, a 
state narcotics conviction because the evidence was forcibly ex- 
tracted from the defendant's stomach, the dissenting judges 
concluded that the behavior of the prosecutor violated due pro- 
cess since the prosecutor did " 'more than offend some fastidi- 
ous squeamishness or private sentimentalism about 
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks 
the conscience.'"76 The dissent noted that due process, al- 
though usually applied to trial procedures, has recently been 
extended to cover pretrial investigative procedures, particularly 
if the exclusionary rule fails to provide an effective remedy.77 
There was a considerable difference, according to the dissent, 
between undercover investigations of criminal projects actually 
in progress and infiltration into ostensibly innocent institu- 
tions.78 The dissent also disagreed with, but did not elaborate 
upon, the majority's assertion that there was no violation of the 
defendants' constitutional or other cognizable rights.79 
Upon reading the majority and dissenting opinions,80 one is 
jury in the first degree, forgery in the second degree, offering a false instrument 
for filing in the first degree "and various misdemeanors." Id. 
74. The dissent claimed that the prosecutor attempted to "set . . . up" the 
defendants. Id. at 355,362 N.Y.S.2d at 524 
75. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
76. 46 A.D.2d at 356, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 525 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. at 172; see text accompanying note 179 injia. 
77. Id. The dissent cited United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 
1974). In Toscanino, the court remanded the case for a hearing regarding alle- 
gations that the defendant was forcibly brought into the United States after be- 
ing kidnapped and tortured. Id. at 281. 
78. The opinion noted: 
Infiltration by deceit without the utilization of the judicial process may 
well be necessary in the never ending and legitimate war against 
crime, but despoilation of the fountain of justice itself must be refused 
sanction as violative of every sense of decency, enlightened public pol- 
icy and a due regard for the observance of good morals and ethical 
conduct. 
46 A.D.2d at 355,362 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (emphasis omitted). 
79. Id. at 358,362 N.Y.S.2d at 527. The dissent also disputed, without elabo- 
ration, the majority's attempt to "erect a Berlin wall" between the Vitale case, 
and the subsequent pejury indictments. Id. 
80. On appeal, the court of appeals afErmed on procedural grounds, with- 
out reviewing the merits of the criticized conduct. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 
N.Y.2d 421,330 N.Eld 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
After this afErmation, the case was vigorously litigated. Actions for declar- 
atory and injunctive relief by Rao and Rao, Jr., brought in the District Court for 
the Southeni District of New York were dismissed. Rao v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 
2376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,1975); Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
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struck by the authors' unusually hyperbolic and vituperative 
language. The Second Circuit's language in Archer, in contrast, 
is restrained. One would not expect this expression of outrage 
by the same state appellate court that affirmed the conviction 
in Archer; the facts in the two cases are not sufficiently dissimi- 
lar to call for such markedly different characterizations of the 
prosecutor's conduct. 
Like the Second Circuit in United States v. Archer, the 
court in Nigrone did not satisfactorily analyze its criticism of 
the prosecutor's commission of crimes. The court failed to ex- 
amine the necessity for the procedure and whether alternative 
techniques were available to gather evidence of corruption in 
the court system. The court's emotional rhetoric also pre- 
cluded a dispassionate discussion of the specific harm that the 
prosecutor's conduct occasioned, and whether that harm was 
outweighed by the uncovering of corruption. Moreover, the 
court did not explain why it is any less criminal for a govern- 
ment officer to participate in narcotics or counterfeiting con- 
spiracies than to Wt ra t e  the court system. 
Two doctrinal limits that might provide the principled and 
rigorous analysis so apprently lacking in the several judges' 
outraged opinions were raised, but never developed in these 
decisions. The first of these limits, the doctrine of entrap- 
ment,Bl requires an analysis of both the particular undercover 
technique employed and the general policies that questionable 
undercover tactics advance or disserve. The second doctrine, 
due process,sz offers an even more particular analytical fiame- 
30,1975). In a subsequent action, the Extraordinary Special and Trial Term dis- 
missed the indictments on Dec. 2, 1975, predicating its decision upon the pres- 
entation of allegedly improper evidence to the grand jury that indicted the 
defendants. On appeal, however, the indictments were reinstated. People v. 
Rao, 53 A.D.2d 904,386 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1976). 
The defendants then renewed their motions to dismiss the indictments in 
the trial court. The court granted Rao's motion, finding that the evidence to 
support the two perjury counts was insufficient. People v. Rao, 177 N.Y.L.J., 
March 17, 1977, at 1415 (Kings County N.Y. Sup. Ct.). The court denied mo- 
tions to dismiss as against Rao, Jr., and Nigrone. Nigrone's indictment was sub- 
sequently dismissed on the ground that electronically recorded evidence 
necessary to prove the perjury was improperly sealed and therefore required 
suppression. People v. Rao, Jr., 177 N.Y. L.J., September 13,1977, at 12. 
A jury later convicted Rao, Jr., of pe jury  in the third degree. See N.Y. PE- 
NAL LAW 8 210.05 (McKinney 1965). This conviction was reversed on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a violation of due process. People v. 
Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88,425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1980). 
81. See notes 83-169 infia and accompanying text. 
82. See notes 170-263 infia and accompanying text. 
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work for isolating and balancing the elements of harm, 
prosecutorial good faith, and unfairness. 
Entrapment is one of the most confusing and controversial 
legal doctrines.83 Unknown at common law,84 it evolved into a 
substantive criminal defense only in the last fifty years.85 The 
word itself should not connote sinister and legally unaccept- 
able behavior on the part of government officials in luring citi- 
zens into crime.86 The courts consistently have recognized that 
it is permissible-and often indispensable--for government offl- 
cials to contrive traps and to utilize deception to obtain evi- 
dence of crime.87 Entrapment becomes unlawful and 
constitutes a defense only when governmental officials entice 
innocent persons into crime.88 Thus, the critical inquiries are 
the nature of the enticement and the character of the person 
enticed. Neither of these issues is easily resolved. In examin- 
83. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. 
L. REV. 245, 263 (1942); Note, 'The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat"-The 
Comtitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE LJ. 942, 943 (1965). 
The doctrine of entrapment has inspired an immense body of scholarly 
literature. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINI?. L REV. 163,167 n.13 
(1976), in which the author catalogues numerous commentaries on the subject. 
84. DeFeo, Entrapment w a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its His- 
tory, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.FL. REV. 243,244 (1967); Mikell, supra note 
83, at 245-46. 
85. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), the Supreme Court first 
discussed the validity of entrapment, its theoretical basis, and its procedural el- 
ements. The Court had adverted to the doctrine earlier in Casey v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 413,418-19 (1928), but had not discussed it thoroughly. 
In United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688), 
apparently the first federal case in which a court considered the doctrine, the 
court decided the case, not on the ground of entrapment, but on the ground 
that the defendant's acts did not come within the statutory prohibition. In Woo 
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), a federal court held, for the first 
time, that defendants were entitled to an acquittal, when government agents 
repeatedly solicited them to commit the crime with which they were charged. 
86. See People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794,802,264 P.2d 521,525 (1953) ("It is 
not the entrapment of a criminal upon which the law frowns, but the seduction 
of innocent people into a criminal career.") (quoting People v. Schwartz, 109 
Cal. App. 2d 450,455,240 P.2d 1024,1027 (1952)); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1031 
(2d ed. 1969). Law enforcement offlcials are permitted to "trap . . . the unwary 
criminal" but are not permitted to "trap . . . the unwary innocent." Sherman v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 369,372 (1958). 
87. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); United 
States. v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 
(1971). 
88. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958); Casey v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 413,423-24 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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ing entrapment, this Article will provide a brief overview of the 
law of entrapment, and discuss its application to undercover 
tactics in general, and to the staged arrest in particular. 
Although some lower courts had long mentioned entrap- 
ment in dicta and had accepted it as a defense,*g the Supreme 
Court first considered the doctrine in 1932.90 Since then, the 
Court has closely reexamined entrapment in three other 
cases.91 From this concise body of law, it is possible to isolate 
the elements, rationale, scope, and procedure of the defense. 
The four cases involved defendants convicted of contraband vi- 
olations.92 In each case, a government agent either instigated 
the defendant's criminal behavior or Mtra ted  ongoing crimi- 
nal activity. 
In Sonelk v. United States,93 the Supreme Court, in revers- 
ing a conviction for illegal sale of liquor, held that under the 
circumstances, a defense of entrapment was available as a 
question of fact and should have been submitted to the jury.94 
The undisputed proof on the issue of entrapment showed that a 
federal prohibition agent visited the defendant and repeatedly 
asked him for liquor.95 Eventually, after the agent had ingrati- 
ated himself with the defendant, the defendant acquiesced.96 
Additional proof showed that the defendant strenuously re- 
sisted the agent's importuning, had a good character, and was 
not involved in the liquor business. In rebuttal, government 
witnesses testifled that the defendant had the "general reputa- 
89. See note 85 supra. 
90. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
91. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The Supreme 
Court considered entrapment in several other decisions, but never reviewed its 
substantive or procedural aspects. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 
(1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
92. The large majority of cases raising the entrapment defense involve con- 
traband violations. See Park, supra note 83, at 223 n.198,230 11.223. Thus far, the 
Supreme Court has not closely examined the limits of the entrapment defense 
in a noncontraband case. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,493 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
93. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
94. Id. at 452. 
95. Id. at 439-40. 
96. Aware that the defendant was a World War veteran and a member of 
the same division as the agent had served in, the agent engaged him in conver- 
sation about common war experiences. Id. 
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tion of a rum-runner."97 
Agreeing that entrapment was a valid defense, a majority 
of the Court formulated a two-part test. The first element of 
the test focuses on the behavior of the government official and 
requires some form of governmental inducement of the defend- 
ant's act.98 By contrast, the second element focuses on the de- 
fendant's character and mental state--the defendant must be a 
law-abiding citizen with no predisposition toward the crime.99 
This formulation has been termed the "subjective" test of en- 
trapment because it is primarily concerned with the character 
and mental state of the defendant200 
The Court based its rationale for the defense on three theo- 
ries. First, the Court invoked estoppel principles, refusing to 
allow the government to prosecute a defendant for a crime it 
instigated.101 Second, the Court said that it would be against 
public policy to prosecute a defendant under these circum- 
stances; the Court had to stop the prosecution 'Yo protect [the 
government] *om the illegal conduct of its officers and to pre- 
serve the purity of its courts."lo2 Third, the Court relied on 
statutory construction, claiming that the statute defining the 
crime in question could not have been intended to apply if gov- 
97. Id. at 441. 
98. The Court used the words 'Linstigated," "lured," 'lepeated and persis- 
tent solicitation," and "[took] advantage of sentiment aroused," to characterize 
the actions of the government oficial. Id. 
99. In the language of the opinion, the second element is satisfied when a 
defendant, such as Sorrells, has "IIo previous disposition to commit [the 
crime]," is an "industrious," 'law-abiding citizen," has no "criminal design," is 
"an innocent person" against whom the government "originates" the "criminal 
design" and then "implant[s] in the mind of [the] innocent person the disposi- 
tion to commit the alleged offense." Id. at 441-42. 
100. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,496-97 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dis- 
senting). Others have called this test the "federal defense," the "genesis of the 
criminal designs" formula, or the "origin of the criminal intent" formula. See 
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091,1102 (1951); Park, supra note 83, at 16566. 
This formulation is the rule in the federal courts and all but seven state ju- 
risdictions. See People v. Barraza, 23 CaL3d 675, 689, 591 P.2d 947, 955,153 Cal. 
Rptr. 459, 467 (1979) (listing the jurisdictions that have rejected the federal 
rule). 
101. 287 U.S. at 452. The Court never seriously disputed that the defendant 
possessed the requisite actus reas and mens rea necessary for criminal liabil- 
ity. Id. at 445-46. See W.  LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK N CRIMINAL AW 175- 
76 (1972). 
The Supreme Court suggested a distinction between estoppel and entrap 
ment in two other cases, Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), and Cox v. Louisi- 
ana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). See Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal 
Cases, 78 YALE LJ. 1046 (1969). 
102. 287 U.S. at 446. 
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ernment officials abused their power by luring innocent per- 
sons into committing crimes just to punish them.103 
In a separate opinion joined by Justices Brandeis and 
Stone, Justice Roberts proposed a different formulation of the 
defense. This alternative test only asks whether the govern- 
ment official instigated the crime, and does not focus upon the 
alleged innocence of the defendant204 This formulation has 
been termed the "objective" test of entrapment because it is 
primarily concerned with the government's method of captur- 
ing criminals.105 The rationale for the doctrine lies not in a 
"strained and unwarranted" interpretation of a statute that ren- 
ders guiltless defendants whose criminal acts, coupled with 
their intent to do the acts, plainly brings them within the statu- 
tory definition of the crime.106 Rather, "the true foundation of 
the doctrine [is] in the public policy which protects the purity 
of government and its processes."lo7 Viewed in this manner, 
entrapment becomes a question of law for the court, and not a 
jury question haught with "false issue [s]" such as the defend- 
ant's previous criminal behavior and bad reputation.108 
The Supreme Court addressed the entrapment defense 
again in Sherman v. United States,log in a review of a narcotics 
conviction. Whereas the Sorrells Court sought to establish the 
elements and basis of the defense, the Sherman Court, relying 
on Sorrells, decided whether the defendant proved entrapment 
103. Id. at 448. Thus, "in the light of a plain public policy and of the proper 
administration of justice," the defendant's acts were not within the statutory 
prohibition. Id. at 451. 
104. Justice Roberts stated that 
[tlhe applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a 
c m e  instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no 
comparison of equities as between the guilty offlcial and the @ty de- 
fendant, has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle 
of public policy. 
Id. at 459. 
105. See, e.g., W. WAVE & A. SCOTP, supra note 101, at 371-72. The objec- 
tive test has also been referred to as the "hypothetical person" defense and the 
"officer's conduct" test. See Donnelly, supra note 100, at 1102; Park, supra note 
83, at 165-66. 
The objective test has been adopted by the Model Penal Code and the pro- 
posed new Federal Criminal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed 
Offlcial Draft, 1962); U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, 
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL C ~ A L  CODE8 702(2) (1971). Commentators on 
the subject overwhelmingly have opted for the objective test. See W. LAFAVE & 
A. Scon; supra note 101, at 371-73; authorities cited in Park, supra note 83, at 
167 1.3. 
106. 287 U.S. at 456. 
107. Id. at 455. 
108. Id. at 458. 
109. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 585 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 2  
586 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:567 
as a matter of law, and reassessed the proper formulation for 
making that determination. 
The facts in Sherman resemble those in Sorrells.110 A gov- 
ernment informer named Kalchinian first met Sherman at the 
office of a doctor who was treating both for narcotics addiction. 
After several meetings, and after their kiendship had begun to 
develop, Kalchinian, claiming that he was not responding to 
treatment, repeatedly asked Sherman if he knew where to ob- 
tain narcotics and whether Sherman could supply him with 
some. Although Sherman resisted these initial entreaties, 
Kalchinian's repeated complaints of suffering eventually 
caused him to acquiesce, and obtain narcotics for Kalchinian 
on several occasions. Sherman did not profit financially from 
these transactions. The issue of entrapment was submitted to 
the jury. Sherman was convicted, and sentenced to ten years' 
irnprisonment.lll 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that 
entrapment was established as a matter of law.112 The Court 
disagreed, however, on the proper basis for the decision, the 
disagreement paralleling the division in Sorrells. Relying on 
the subjective test of the Sorrells majority, Chief Justice War- 
ren, for a five-member majority, concluded it was "patently 
clear" that the government agent "induced" Sherman to obtain 
narcotics for him, thereby satisfying the first element of the en- 
trapment test.113 Futherrnore, the Court found that Sherman 
was an "innocent party" who was "beguile [dl . . . into commit- 
ting crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted,"lld 
thereby satisfying the second element of the defense.115 The 
-- - 
110. Id. at 371. 
111. Id. at 372. 
112. Id. at 373. 
113. Id. The Court emphasized that repeated requests were necessary to 
overcome Sherman's "refusal," "evasiveness," and "hesitancy" before the agent 
finally obtained Sherman's "capitulation." Id. It is not clear from the opinion 
to what extent these repeated requests satisfy the element of inducement or 
their relevancy on the issue of predisposition. 
114. Id. at 376. The Court noted: "Law enforcement does not require meth- 
ods such as this!' Id. Quaere whether the Court is not in fact employing a va- 
riation of the objective or police-conduct test of entrapment. 
115. The Court barely analyzed the issue of predispostion. It rejected the 
government's argument that Sherman's two prior narcotics convictions demon- 
strated his predisposition. It also rejected, in conclusory language, the govern- 
ment's claim that Sherman evinced a ?ready complaisance" to accede to the 
agent's request. The Court noted that no evidence existed that Sherman was in 
the narcotics trade; no narcotics were found in his apartment; he did not profit 
from the sales to Kalchinian; and he was trying to overcome his drug habit at 
the time of the events in question. Id. at 375. 
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majority re-ed, and explicitly refused to reexamine,llG the 
statutory construction rationale of the Sorrells majority.117 
Justice Frankfurter, and the three Justices who joined in 
his concurring opinion, strongly disagreed with the subjective 
test, arguing that it was analytically confusing, an inadequate 
guide to lower courts, and divergent from the true ends of jus- 
tice.118 In a frequently quoted passage embodying the objective 
formulation that he preferred, Justice Frankfurter observed: 
"The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court 
must direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings 
respond, for the proper use of governmental power."llg Frank- 
furter also noted that the court, not the jury, should decide 
whether the police acted impermissibly. He argued that this is 
the only way that the court can protect the integrity of its 
processes from abuse by law enforcement officials, as well as 
provide meaningful standards for the future guidance of official 
conduct.120 
Since Sherman, the Court has considerably narrowed the 
defense of entrapment on two occasions. In each case, the 
Court considered whether the doctrine of entrapment is avail- 
able to a concededly predisposed defendant following substan- 
tial government involvement and assistance in a narcotics 
enterprise. In United States v. Russell,l2l an undercover agent 
ifitrated an illicit drug laboratory, gained the confidence of 
the defendants, and agreed to supply an essential chemical in 
return for one-half of the drug produced.122 Russell was con- 
victed, and on appeal urged that he had established entrap- 
ment as a matter of law, despite his conceded predisposition,l23 
116. Id. at 376. 
117. It agreed that "Congress could not have intended that its statutes were 
to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations." Id. at 372. 
118. Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at 382. It is "sheer fiction," said Frankfurter, to suggest that Con- 
gress did not intend its penal statutes to cover the tempting of innocent per- 
sons. If such were the case, a defendant should be relieved of the 
consequences of his act, whether the tempter is a private person or a govern- 
ment official, and such is not the case. Id. at 379. See United States v. Burkley, 
591 F.2d 903, 911 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979); United 
States v. Per4 584 F.2d 1316,1320 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979). 
120. 356 U.S. at 385. 
121. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
122. Id. at 42526. The evidence showed that the chemical supplied by the 
government agent was dilBcult to obtain, and that the government made it 
more so by inducing some chemical supply fkms in the area to cease selling 
the drug. Id. at 426-27. 
123. Id. at 427. 
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because of intolerable government participation in the criminal 
activity.124 In Hampton v. United States,l25 the defendant was 
convicted of selling heroin. Under the defendant's version of 
the transaction, the heroin that he allegedly sold to a govern- 
ment agent was the same drug that the government earlier had 
supplied to him through another agent. Conceding his predis- 
position,l26 Hampton requested an entrapment instruction that 
required acquittal if the jury found the degree of governmental 
participation that he alleged.127 
As in Sorrells and Sherman, the Justices' votes reflected 
disagreement over whether the focus of the doctrine should be 
on the defendant's character or on the conduct of the govern- 
ment. Using the subjective test, five Justices upheld both Rus- 
sell's and Hampton's convictions, concluding that the 
entrapment defense was not available to either defendant.128 
Arguably, neither proved sufficient government inducement or 
solicitation under the test's first element. More importantly, 
both also conceded that they were predisposed to commit the 
crime, thus failing to meet the second element of the test.129 
The four dissenting Justices in Russell, and the three dissent- 
ing Justices in Hampton, used the previously rejected objective 
test, ignored the defendant's predisposition as irrelevant, and 
found that the government conducted itself improperly.130 Be- 
cause the defendants met the requirement of the objective test, 
the dissenters would have upheld their entrapment defenses.131 
An examination of these cases reveals three salient points. 
First, the Court has refused to adopt the Roberts-Frankfurter 
objective test that makes the entrapment defense turn on the 
conduct of the government; Russell and Hampton illustrate the 
Court's continued adherence to the subjective test set out by 
124. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Russell~s convic- 
tion on the sole ground that an undercover agent supplied an essential chemi- 
cal for manufacturing the drug which formed the basis of the conviction. The 
court held that as a matter of law, "a defense to a criminal charge may be 
founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the crimi- 
nal enterprise." United States v. Russell, 459 F2d 671,673 (9th Cir. 1972). 
125. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
126. Id. at 489-90. 
127. Id. at 487-88. 
128. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490 (concession of predispostion 
"rendered this defense unavailable"); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 
(finding of defendant's predisposition "fatal to his claim of entrapment"). 
129. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490; United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. at 436. 
130. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 496-97; United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. at 436-37,446,449-50. 
131. 425 U.S. at 497; 411 U.S. at 436,450. 
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the Sorrells majority.132 Second, the Court has limited the de- 
fense to a narrowly defined class of unsuspecting victims. It 
emphasized that the defense of entrapment did not give the ju- 
diciary unfettered power to veto any law enforcement tech- 
nique it did not like, but only those that trapped innocent 
victims.133 Third, the Court refused to elevate the doctrine of 
entrapment, traditionally a nonconstitutional defense,l34 to a 
constitutional level, even where the actions of law enforcement 
officials violate fundamental principles of due process.135 A ma- 
jority of the Court indicated, however, that principles of due 
process might be independently applicable if government in- 
volvement in crime reached an as yet undefined "demonstrable 
level of outrageousness."l36 Thus, although some support for a 
more objective view of entrapment exists, the doctrinal view 
currently prevailing requires the government to induce a sub- 
jectively innocent, unsuspecting victim into committing a 
crime. 
132. The majority in Russell clearly stated: "We decline to overrule these 
cases. Sorrelkr is a precedent of long standing that has already been reexam- 
ined in Sherman and impLicitly there reaf3rmed." United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. at 433. 
133. The Russell Court noted that for a court to determine what kind and 
degree of government involvement is excessive "introduces an unmanageably 
subjective standard which is contrary to the holdings of this Court in Smel l s  
and Sherman." Id. at 435. 
134. Id. at 433. The Supreme Court noted in Russell that because the de- 
fense was "not of a constitutional dimension," Congress could broaden the sub- 
stantive definition if it chose to. Id. The proposed new Federal Criminal Code 
would do just that. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL AWS, A 
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL C ~ A C  CODE 8 702(2) (1971). 
135. 'The [constitutional] analogy is imperfect," said the Court. United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. In Russell and Hampton, the government of3- 
cial "violated no independent constitutional right" of the defendant. Hampton 
v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490-91. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. 
Just as courts fashioned the exclusionary rule to deter the police from com- 
mitting unlawful searches and seizures, Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and 
from coercing confessions, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), so might the 
courts fashion a similar rule to deter investigative methods that violate funda- 
mental standards of fairness. Several commentators have urged the constitu- 
tionalization of the entrapment defense. See generally Note, The Viability of 
the Entrapment Defense in  the Condtuthzul  Context, 59 IOWA L REV. 655 
(1974); Note, Entrapment-A Dw Process Defense-WhQt Process Is Due? 11 
Sw. UL. REV. 663 (1979); Note, The Defense of Entrapment: Next Move - Due 
Process? 1971 UTAH L REV. 266; Note, supra note 83. 
136. 425 U.S. at 495 n 7  (Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). Since the 
three dissenting Justices in Hampton would invoke due process in cases of ex- 
cessive government involvement in crime, id. at 497 (Brennan, J., Stewart, J., 
and Marshall, J., dissenting), it appears that a due process defense is available 
to a predisposed defendant who has been entrapped by flagrant governmental 
misconduct. 
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B. E ~ M E N T  AS A LIMITATION ON UNDERCOVER POLICE 
PRAc'I'IcEs 
Although defendants frequently assert entrapment as a de- 
fense in prosecutions resulting from undercover police activity, 
the defense is rarely sustained.137 Contrary to what may be a 
common perception, undercover police activity that aids and 
abets the commission of crime does not necessarily qualify as 
impermissible entrapment.138 A growing body of case law in 
the lower courts139 attests to the Supreme Court's view that 
"entrapment is a relatively limited defense."lm There are two 
reasons for this. 
First, strong pragmatic considerations limit the use of en- 
trapment. The necessity for undercover techniques and the in- 
herently contradictory evidence of a defendant's predisposition 
lead courts and juries to reject the defense. Certain kinds of 
crime are almost impossible to detect without the use of under- 
cover tactics. For example, contraband crimes such as narcot- 
ics, weapons, and currency violations usually require disguised 
government involvement or solicitation to gather evidence of 
the criminal activity.141 This is also true of official corruption, 
white collar crime, and organized crime.142 In these crimes, 
there is no victim to report the crime to the police and to pro- 
vide evidence of wrongdoing; there are no eyewitnesses be- 
cause the criminal behavior is clandestine, and involves 
conduct that is mutually beneficial to all participants; and there 
is a dearth of tangible or otherwise observable proof of crime to 
provide the police with clues. 
Defendants also will find it diflicult to prove lack of predis- 
position. To raise entrapment, defendants as a practical matter 
must admit to having committed the proscribed act, and must 
rely instead on the excuse that the government instigated a 
crime that they otherwise would not have committed.143 Yet 
137. See Park, supra note 83, at 178 n.44. Park statistically demonstrates the 
infrequency with which the entrapment defense is accepted. The author's ex- 
perience as a prosecutor, and as a defense attorney involved in considerable 
criminal litigation for Bteen years, supports this conclusion. 
138. See notes 83-136 supra and accompanying text. ' 
139. See, e.g., United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Unites States v. Rippy, 606 F.2d 1150, 115455 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
140. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973). 
141. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text. 
142. See id. 
143. Although defendants theoretically could assert entrapment, as well as 
a claim that they did not commit the proscribed act, see Scriber v. United 
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the successful government offlcial involved will undoubtedly 
claim that the defendant unhesitatingly succumbed to the in- 
ducement.144 A jury, con£ronted with contradictory evidence of 
the defendant's innocent predisposition, and a tacit recognition 
that undercover police methods frequently are indispensable to 
uncovering and prosecuting crimes,l45 in practice will probably 
reject such a defense. 
Apart from practical reasons, the definition of entrapment 
under the majority formulation, as interpreted by the courts, 
gives the defense limited utility. As noted above,lM in practice 
this test requires defendants to prove, first, that the govern- 
ment agent induced them to commit the crime, and second, 
that they were not ready and willing and were not awaiting a 
"propitious opportunity" to commit the crime.147 To be suc- 
cessful, defendants must show a fairly significant degree of gov- 
ernmental inducement. Government initiation of the crime, 
without more, is usually insufficient to sustain the defense348 
States, 4 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925), juries might view such a claim with 
skepticism 
144. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE 8 2.13 (Proposed OfEcial Draft, 1962). 
145. A widely accepted jury instruction on entrapment contains the follow- 
ing passage: 
For example, when the government suspects that a person is en- 
gaged in the illicit sale of narcotics, it is not entrapment for a govern- 
ment agent to pretend to be someone else and to offer either directly or 
through an informer or other decoy to purchase narcotics from the sus- 
pected person. 
1 E. DEVrI'r & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND  STR RUCTIONS 8 13.09 
(3d ed. 1977). See Park, supra note 83, at 176-77 n.39. 
146. See notes 83-136 supra and accompanying text. 
147. The test, as phrased here, is from the oft-cited passage in Judge 
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 
1952). 
148. There is considerable confusion and controversy over the degree of 
proof necessary to satisfy the element of inducement. Most courts require a 
defendant raising the entrapment defense to demonstrate something more than 
mere solicitation. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,43437 (1963); United 
States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 
(1979); United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 429 n 9  (D.C. Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); 
United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1001 (3d Cir. 1969). The Second Cir- 
cuit, however, apparently requires no more than mere solicitation to establish 
inducement. See United States v. Greenberg, 444 F.2d 369,371 (2d Cir.), cwt. de- 
nied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267,269 (2d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 953 (1970); Sherman v. United States 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d 
Cir. 1952). 
Apart from the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the element of in- 
ducement, courts must also decide when the evidence requires them to submit 
the defense of entrapment to the jury. Compare United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 
955,959 (2d Cir. 1966) (if inducement has been shown, production by defendant 
of any evidence negating predisposition requires submission of defense to 
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Defendants must also offer substantial proof of their unwilling- 
ness to commit the crime.149 Proof that they were ready and 
willing to commit either the crime charged or a similar crime, 
without the intervention of a government official, almost invari- 
ably defeats the defense.150 Further, if predisposition is con- 
ceded or proved-as it usually is in cases in which the 
defendants are involved in criminal activitylsl--courts will ap- 
parently condone any amount of governmental involvement in 
the crime short of conduct bordering on the patently outra- 
geous.152 Finally, the limited appellate review of factual issues 
determined by a jury,153 and the majority test's classification of 
entrapment as a factual question,l54 realistically foreclose re- 
versal of the verdict on grounds of entrapment except in the 
most egregious cases.155 Thus, both pragmatic and legal con- 
jury) with United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. de- 
nied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979) (jury must be instructed on entrapment if there is any 
basis in evidence for Anding that government induced an otherwise unpredis- 
posed person to commit crime). 
149. The courts are not consistent in their definition of predisposition; they 
generally require very little proof to demonstrate predisposition or, correla- 
tively, substantial proof to show lack of predisposition See United States v. 
Bonun, 584 F.2d 424,428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499, 
504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d 
989, 990-91 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); United States v. 
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 
(1978); United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 173-74 (7th Cir. 1976), cwt. denied, 
429 U.S. 833 (1977); United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210,211 (9th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880,882 (2d Cir. 1952). 
150. See, e.g., United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir.), cert. de- 
nied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978) ('"I'he Government's provision of aid, incentive, and 
opportunity for commission of the crime amounts to an entrapment only if it 
appears that the defendant has done that which he would never have done 
were it not for the inducement of Government operatives!'). 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 11516 (2d Cir.), cwt. 
denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973); 
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783,786 (9th Cir. 1971). 
152. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,488-89 (1976); United States 
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434-36 (1973). But see United States v. 'I'wigg, 588 F.2d 
373,376-77 (3d Cir. 1978). 
153. See United States v. M e ,  572 F.2d 1316,1320 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting 
United States v. Rangel 572 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 
(1976)) (" '[elntrapment as a matter of law exists only where there is undis- 
puted testimony making it patently clear that an otherwise innocent person 
was induced to commit the act complained of by the trickery, persuasion or 
fraud of a government agent.' ") (emphasis in original); United States v. Groes- 
sel440 F.2d 602, 606 (5th-Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971) (evidence ''was 
not so overwhelming that it was 'patently clear' or 'obvious' that [defendant] 
was entrapped as a matter of law"). 
154. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958); Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435,452 (1932). 
155. Entrapment as a matter of law was found in the following cases: Sher- 
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 
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siderations make entrapment a limited defense in actions 
based on undercover police practices. 
From the discussion so far, it is not surprising that the de- 
fense of entrapment, as traditionally formulated, apparently of- 
fers very little assistance to a defendant ensnared in a staged 
arrest. In United States v. Archer156 and Nigrone v. Murtagh,l57 
for example, the entrapment defense was not vigorously as- 
serted, and the courts barely mentioned the defense. The fac- 
tual settings in those cases, however, rendered entrapment 
unavailable. This does not mean, of course, that entrapment 
may never be raised as a defense in a staged arrest proceeding. 
To analyze properly whether the entrapment defense would 
ever be applicable to the staged arrest under the majority test 
of entrapment, and its focus upon inducement and predisposi- 
tion, one must differentiate between two levels of government 
undercover activity encompassed in the staged arrest. The first 
level involves the fabrication of a case. The second level in- 
volves the actual solicitation of persons to engage in a corrupt 
plot. 
The actual implementation of the staged case-the first 
level--does not appear to implicate the entrapment defense. 
Although officials have designed the simulated case to permit 
the investigators to observe closely corrupt behavior within the 
system, they have not attempted actual solicitation of corrupt 
1083,1087 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 
1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), afd on remand, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974); 
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971); Williamson v; United States, 311 F.2d 
441,445 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191,195-96 (3d Cir. 
1957); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 
No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982). United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 
1312 (C.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D.D.C. 
1964); People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 326, 172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961); Jones v. 
State, 285 So. 2d 152, 160 (Miss. 1973). 
It appears, however, that Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), and 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), have overruled many of the forego- 
ing cases. In United States v. McGrath, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), following the grant 
of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
for consideration in light of United States v. Russell. Upon remand, the court of 
appeals concluded that Russell "is the controlling law. . . and that the defense 
of entrapment was not available to McGrath." United States v. McGrath, 494 
F.2d 562.563 (7th Cir. 1974). 
156. k86 F:2d 670,682 ( id Cir. 1973). 
157. 46 A.D.2d 343,349, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 518 (1974), afd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 
N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
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behavior. Thus, they have not met the first element of the pre- 
vailing test. One could argue that by penetrating the system 
with a sham case, the investigators have induced judicial and 
court officials to engage in routine court matters necessary to 
process the case. But this is clearly not the kind of inducement 
sufficient to invoke the entrapment defense. Moreover, at this 
level law enforcement officials responsible for setting up the 
case naturally would welcome the initiation of corrupt sugges- 
tions by judges, lawyers, or other court personnel, as such be- 
havior would obviate any claims that the government solicited 
the offense, or that the initiator lacked predisposition. 
Entrapment doctrine would, therefore, not come into play 
in the staged arrest setting until the second level, when the 
governmelit actively solicits or induces criminal activities. 
Once the case has entered the court network, the investigators 
likely will not wait passively for an individual to make a cor- 
rupt overture. More likely, either the roleplaying agents, such 
as the sham defendant, the arresting officer, or another under- 
cover agent perhaps posing as a friend of the defendant, will 
seek to initiate contact with persons in the system in the hope 
that such intervention might yield corrupt responses. The in- 
vestigators in the Archer and Nigrone cases used the latter ap- 
proach. In Archer, an undercover agent approached 
bailbondsman Wasserberger with the aim of helping Bario;l58 
in Nigrone, an undercover agent posing as a friend of the fam- 
ily spoke to Judge Rao about helping Vitale.159 In both cases, 
these solicitations produced corrupt responses which invited 
further undercover investigation. Given this form of govern- 
ment inducement, some courts would hold that the defendant 
has proven at least the first element of the entrapment 
defense.160 
Even assuming, however, that these initial inducements 
and perhaps even further governmental solicitations of others 
take place, one must also consider the second critical element 
of the entrapment defense, the defendant's predisposition. 
Under the majority test, a showing that the defendant was 
ready and willing to engage in corrupt behavior will defeat a 
claim of entrapment regardless of the degree of government in- 
ducement.161 Generally, in cases of white collar crime and offi- 
158. 486 F.2d at 673. 
159. 46 AD2d at 345,362 N.Y.S2d at 515. 
160. See note 148 supra and accompanying text. 
161. See text accompanying notes 12&29,151-52 supra. 
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cia1 corruption, the courts are extremely reluctant to accept a 
defendant's claims of lack of predisposition. Some courts have 
said, for example, that in cases involving receipt of bribes by 
public officials, the defense of entrapment is simply unavaila- 
ble.162 Similarly, in cases where an undercover agent has as- 
sumed the role of a dishonest official willing to be bribed, the 
courts usually find that the bribe giver was predisposed to com- 
mit the offense and therefore cannot claim that he was 
entrapped.163 
The unwillingness of courts to accept lack of predisposition 
claims in cases involving white collar crime and official corrup- 
tion may be attributed to several factors. The considerations of 
necessity, contradictory evidence on the element of predisposi- 
tion, and the narrow legal definition of entrapment restrict the 
defense's application to cases of official corruption in particular, 
just as they restrict its application to undercover police prac- 
tices in general.164 Entrapment is particularly difficult to assert 
for defendants accused of the former type of crime because of 
the positions of trust they occupy and the resulting attitude 
that their conduct must be above temptation.165 Courts feel 
that they must punish any breach of that trust, regardless of 
the nature of the inducement. Thus, police officers who suc- 
cumb to a $50,000 bribe to overlook narcotics violations may 
have lacked predisposition because they would never have 
taken a bribe but for the irresistable nature of the temptation. 
It is unlikely, however, that a court would sustain their entrap- 
ment defenses; as police officers, the defendants occupy such 
important positions of public trust that they are duty bound to 
resist such temptation.166 
By contrast, if a similar police officer solicited the bribe 
from a motorist who had been stopped for intoxicated driving, 
the courts might be more receptive to a claim of entrapment by 
the motorist.167 The motorist does not occupy a position of 
162. State v. Dougherty, 86 N J L  525,534-35,93 A. 98,102 (Sup. Ct),  rev'd on 
other grounds, 88 N.J.L. 209 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915). 
163. See United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1220-23 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 
(1974); United States v. Greenberg, 444 F.2d 369, 371-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 853 (1971). 
164. See notes 141-55 supra and accompanying text. 
165. See State v. Dougherty, 86 N J L  525, 535, 93 A. 98, 102 ("It is no valid 
excuse, for the commission of a crime, by a person holding a public ofEce, that 
he was tempted. His integrity must be above temptation!'); Donnelly, -a 
note 100, at 1115. See ako Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97,98 (6th Cir. 1925). 
166. See Donnelly, supra note 100, at 1115. 
167. See id at 1115 1.71 and cases cited therein. 
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public trust. Also, considerations of public policy might not 
weigh as heavily against the motorist as they would against the 
police officer who receives a bribe. The courts might not want 
public officials who exercise power to offer handsome induce- 
ments to vulnerable citizens to violate the law. There are dif- 
ferent standards of conduct for a police officer and a private 
citizen, as well as different thresholds of resistance to tempta- 
tion. Moreover, there is a question of whether the arbitrary so- 
licitation of bribes from motorists advances any legitimate law 
enforcement interest. Finally, a motorist who initiates bribes is 
easily detected and prosecuted. There is no need to use under- 
cover agents to solicit such actions. Detection of corrupt acts 
by police officers, in contrast, is much more difficult. 
Thus, the majority formulation of entrapment would be of 
limited support to a defendant charged with an offense arising 
out of a staged arrest. Even if faced with egregious government 
conduct, the defendant would not be able to use the defense 
successfully. The minority formulation of the defense would, 
however, provide a doctrinal basis for challenging such a prose- 
cution. Under the latter approach, there is a critical, objective 
inquiry into the methods that the government officials use to 
bring about the defendant's arrest.168 Thus, a court employing 
the minority test could determine that the government's con- 
duct in the staged arrest was sufficiently offensive to require 
dismissal of the indictment. Yet very few jurisdictions have 
adopted the minority view of entrapment.169 The only alterna- 
tive, therefore, for many defendants who have been subjected 
to unreasonable government treatment is reliance on a due 
process analysis. The central issues under this approach, as 
under a minority entrapment approach, are whether the staged 
arrest is offensive or outrageous, and what standards a court 
should use to make such a judgment. Unfortunately, the pres- 
ent due process analysis of undercover police activities does 
not adequately address these issues. 
IV. DUEPROCESSLIMITSONUNDERCOVER 
INVESTIGATIONS 
Due process is the constitutional mechanism for protecting 
168. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra. 
169. See notes 100,105 supra. 
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and enforcing certain moral values.170 In the area of criminal 
law one can identify two such overriding values: ensuring the 
reliability of the guilt-finding process,l71 and preserving the in- 
tegrity of a person's body and mind.172 The first value applies 
to criminal trials or other criminal proceedings in which a de- 
fendant's guilt is adjudicated. The second value applies to gov- 
ernmental oppression, either physical or psychological, of 
individuals. 
This second moral imperative is the one relevant to the 
staged arrest, because the government in a staged arrest may 
be unreasonably and offensively intrusive. To protect this over- 
riding value in similar cases, courts have invoked due process 
to limit government conduct that brutalizes, abuses, or ha- 
rasses,l73 invades privacy,l74 or in other ways unreasonably in- 
trudes into people's lives.175 The Bill of Rights contains specific 
170. For a discussion of the early history and development of due process, 
see R Mom, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926). 'l'wo excellent articles examining 
the role of due process in criminal law are: Kadish, Methodology and Criteria 
in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L J .  319 (1957), 
and Ratner. 2'he Function of the Due Process Clause. 116 U. PA. L REV. 1048 
- (1968). 
171. The Supreme Court has furthered this objective by using a due process 
analysis to apply to the states provisions in the Bill of Rights that ensure a fair 
trial and a reliable determination of guilt. See Richmond Newspapers v. Vir- 
ginia, 448 U.S 555 (1980) (first amendment right to a public trial); Klopfer v. 
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to a speedy trial); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory 
process); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (sixth amendment right to 
impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to 
confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment protection 
against self-incrimination); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (sixth 
amendment right to notice of criminal charges);Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932) (sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, 
due process protection has been rendered virtually co-extensive with the spe- 
ciflc guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
Apart from these specific constitutional protections, the Supreme Court 
has fashioned additional protections to ensure the reliable adjudication of a de- 
fendant's guilt. It has used due process to require trial before an impartial 
judge, see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); to require 
guilt to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 361-64 (1970); to outlaw inflammatory or unfair prosecutorial summations, 
see Grif3n v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); to forbid the use of fraudulent 
evidence, see Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); to require disclosure of excul- 
patory evidence, see United States v. A w ,  427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); to bar the 
use of irrational legal presumptions, see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 
138-41 (1965); and to suppress courtroom identifications based on unfair pre- 
trial lineup procedures, see Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440,443 (1969). 
172. See notes 173-76 injia and accompanying text. 
173. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); United States v. Tos- 
canino, 500 F.2d 267,275 (2d Cir. 1974). 
174. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
175. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,497 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis- 
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provisions that parallel and reinforce this limitation on the gov- 
ernment's power to oppress arbitrarily or cause harm to per- 
sons.176 The Supreme Court has encountered greater doctrinal 
difficulty when invoking due process to protect some relative 
and indefinite concepts such as personal dignity and privacy, 
than when it employs due process to protect the accuracy and 
fairness of the adjudicative process. The reason for this doctri- 
nal difficulty is readily apparent. To protect personal dignity 
and privacy, a court may often have to restrict the ability of ofA- 
cials to detect and prove criminal activity.177 
The classic case illustrating the due process limits on po- 
lice investigation tactics is Rochin v. Cali$ornia. In Rochin, the 
Supreme Court determined that the police officers' use of a 
stomach pump to force two capsules of narcotics from the de- 
fendant's stomach offended due process.178 The Supreme 
Court, in a famous opinion by Justice Frankfurter, reversed 
Rochin's conviction in the state courts: 
[Tlhe proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness about combatting crime too en- 
ergetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally break- 
ing into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth 
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's 
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain 
evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are 
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional 
differentiation.179 
At the time of Rochin's conviction, the only federal basis 
- 
senting); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-80 (3d Cir. 1978). See also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-71 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 
(1959). 
176. The fourth amendment bars the government from unreasonably 
searching persons, seizing their belongings, or rummaging through their 
houses, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,622-32 (1886), thereby protecting 
their privacy and the integrity of their bodies and minds from government inva- 
sion. The fifth amendment protects criminal defendants from being involunta- 
rily retried for the same crime, thereby limiting the government's power to 
harass and oppress them by threatened and repeated prosecutions. See Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,322-23 (1937). The eighth amendment prevents the 
government from inflicting cruel or unusual punishment. See Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910). 
177. One of the principal reasons for the constitutional rule excluding ille- 
gally seized evidence " ' is to deter [the police]-to compel respect for the con- 
stitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way-by removing the 
incentive to disregard it' " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting El- 
kins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,217 (1960)). Plainly, however, while protect- 
ing the privacy and integrity of the individual, this "exclusionary rule" keeps 
reliable and probative evidence from the fact-hders, thereby undermining an 
accurate determination of guilt. 
178. 342 U.S. 165,166,174 (1952). 
179. Id. at 172. 
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for challenging state criminal justice was the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frankfurter ac- 
knowledged that standards for due process enforcement were 
"indefinite and vague."laO The applicable standard was 
whether the police methods " 'offend those canons of decency 
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English- 
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most hei- 
nous offenses.' "181 Just as coerced confessions were offensive 
to human dignity, the methods in Rochin were offensive to "a 
sense of justice."l82 
The "evanescent standards" that the Court employed to 
overturn Rochin's convictionl83 have served as the principal 
benchmark by which the courts determine the permissible 
scope of investigative methods.184 Although Justice Frank- 
furter claimed that due process was not "a matter of judicial ca- 
price,"l85 it is understandable that a test that depends on the 
shock capacity of the consciences of particular judges has cre- 
ated confusing and unpredictable results. For example, the 
Supreme Court refused to sustain an action against a sheriff for 
false imprisonment in a case of mistaken identity.186 An erro- 
neous imprisonment might give rise to a Rochin violation, how- 
ever, if the s h e s  'Ldeliberately and repeatedly refused to 
check the identity of a complaining prisoner against readily 
available mug shots and fingerprints."l87 If a police officer pur- 
sues and arrests a suspect out of revenge, following the dismis- 
sal of a civil lawsuit that the officer brought against the suspect, 
due process bars prosecution.188 Yet in a recent decision, the 
Supreme Court refused to find a Rochin due process violation 
where, to secure evidence, the police deliberately violated an 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
182. Id. at 173. 
183. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring). This case illustrates the ongoing de- 
bate on the court between those Justices who view due process as embodying a 
philosophy of fundamental fairness to be determined by "a disinterested in- 
quiry pursued in the spirit of science," id. at 172, and critics of that approach, 
notably Justice Black. The latter would o?t for applying to the states all of the 
protections embodied in the Bill of Rights-in Rochin, the fourth and fLfth 
amendments-as opposed to an "accordion-like" philosophy whose "nebulous 
standards," id. at 175, "have been used to nullify state legislative programs 
passed to suppress evil economic practices." Id. at 177. 
184. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-32 (1973). 
185. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172. 
186. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979). 
187. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
188. United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534,537-40 (E.D. Ark. 1977). 
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individual's fourth amendment rights knowing that the defend- 
ant lacked standing to challenge the violation.189 
In addition to creating unpredictable results, the Rochin 
principle is frequently raised as a bar to conviction, but is sus- 
tained only in extreme situations.190 In cases of government- 
sanctioned violence, for example, illegal kidnapping and torture 
may violate the Rochin due process test,lgl whereas "unneces- 
sary and unreasonable" violence to effectuate an arrest may 
not.192 The use of force by prison guards generally does not vi- 
olate due process, even if the force is excessive,l93 whereas an 
unprovoked assault on a prisoner does violate due process.194 
The use of physical force in fingerprinting and including a sus- 
pect in a line-up is reasonable and not shocking to the con- 
science,l95 whereas forcibly compelling a suspect to submit to 
189. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,737 n.9 (1980). See text accompa- 
nying notes 37478 infia. 
190. For example, two Supreme Court cases decided shortly after Rochin 
presented examples of arguably conscience-shocking police methods. In one 
case, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), police investigators made repeated 
illegal entries into defendant's home, where they installed a microphone which 
they used to overhear incriminating conversations. Id. at 130-31. In the other 
case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), at the request of police investiga- 
tors, a physician inserted a hypodermic needle into the defendant's uncon- 
scious body to obtain a blood sample used to convict him of vehicular 
manslaughter. Id. at 433. Rochin was distinguished in both cases, in the first 
because no ''coercion, violence or brutality to the person" was committed, 347 
U.S. at 133, and in the second because "nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' " was in- 
volved, 352 U.S. at 435. 
Only three federal cases since 1952 have held that the Rochin standard was 
expressly controlling. See LeGrande v. Redman, 423 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Del. 
1976); United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198 (E.D. Wis. 
1974); United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.D.C. 1957). See also 
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267,273-75 (2d Cir. 1974). 
191. Id. at 275-76. But see United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 
65-66 (2d Cir.), c& denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Winter, 509 
F.2d 975,987-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 
825 (1975); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 747-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 936 (1973); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561,561-62 (10th Cir. 1964). 
192. United States v. Lawrence, 434 F. Supp. 441,446 (D.D.C. 1977) (shooting 
fleeing suspect in the back may have been "unnecessary and unreasonable," 
but not so outrageous as to bar defendant's prosecution). 
193. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F2d 1028,1033 (2d Cir.), c& denied sub nom. 
John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Lock v. Jenkins, 464 F. Supp. 541, 549 
(N.D. Ind. 1978), modzfied, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981); LeGrande v. Redman, 423 
F. Supp. 524, 528 (D. Del. 1976). Cf. Martinez v. Rosado, 474 F. Supp. 758, 760-61 
(S.DN.Y. 1979), rev'd, 614 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment for guard 
reversed because issue of excessive force was in factual dispute). 
194. Vargas v. Correa, 416 F. Supp. 266,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Mere- 
dith v. Arizona, 523 F2d 481,484 (9th Cir. 1975). 
195. Appeal of Maguire, 571 F.2d 675,677 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 
(1978). 
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the swabbing of a bodily organ for blood stains is shocking.196 
The use of force, such as choking and pinching, to prevent a 
suspect from disposing of evidence is not shocking,l97 whereas 
forcing a pregnant woman to submit to a body cavity search is 
shocking.198 
This reluctance to accept the due process argument except 
in the most egregious cases may be attributable, in part, to the 
difficulty in evaluting police practices where the police have in- 
fringed no specific constitutional right. One court recently ob- 
served: "Where the line between permissible and 
impermissible police conduct is to be drawn is hard to figure 
and even more difficult to express. There simply are no sharply 
defined standards in this area."199 An added reason for this re- 
luctance is the view of some courts that the constitution en- 
trusts law enforcement to the executive branch, and that in the 
absence of a violation of a specifically protected right, the judi- 
ciary should not exercise "a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law en- 
forcement practices of which it did not approve."200 
Under the Rochin standard, government conduct that is 
brutal, offensive, or "shocks the conscience" may violate due 
process. Relying on this subjective test, courts have handed 
down varied and unpredictable rulings, generally finding a vio- 
lation of due process only in the most flagrantly offensive situa- 
tions. As this Article points out below,2ol courts use this same 
subjective test in cases involving undercover police practices 
and, therefore, hand down similarly unpredictable rulings 
which fail to guide the subsequent courts that also must ana- 
lyze governmental misconduct. 
1. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court occasionally has referred to constitu- 
tional limitations on undercover police conduct, particularly in 
196. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378,386-87 (D.D.C. 1957). 
197. People v. Bracamonte, 15 CaL 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 CaL Rptr. 528 
(1975); State v. Santos, 101 NJ. Super. 98,243 A.2d 274 (1968); State v. Young, 15 
Wash. App. 581,550 P.2d 689 (1976). 
198. United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (E.D. 
Wis. 1974). 
199. united States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534, 539 (E.D. Ark. 1977). 
200. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). The Supreme Court 
has on occasion, however, specific all^ sumested that the executive branch take 
disciplinary measures ag&st offen&ng~ficials. See United States v. Payner, 
447 U.S. 727,733-34 n.5 (1980): Inrine v. California, 347 U.S. 128.138 11954). 
201. ~ee.notes 202& in& and accompanyi~ text. 
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the context of entrapment analysis. In Sheman v. United 
States, the Court sustained the defendant's entrapment de- 
fense,202 and compared undercover methods that entice inno- 
cent persons into crime with coerced confessions and unlawful 
searches,203 implying that all such practices are uniformly ob- 
jectionable because they involve government misconduct 
flagrantly offensive to the dignity of the individual.204 On two 
other occasions the Supreme Court declared that certain types 
of government behavior--described as "the most indefensible 
sort of entrapment by the State9'-amounted to a violation of 
due process.205 In Raley v. Ohio,206 the Court held that due 
process barred the conviction of persons for refusing to answer 
questions before a state investigating commission because the 
defendants relied upon the government's assurances that they 
had a constitutional privilege to refuse to answer.207 In Cox v. 
Louisiana,20* the Court held that due process precluded the 
conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct for picketing 
"near" a courthouse in violation of a local ordinance when gov- 
ernment officials advised the defendant that such a demonstra- 
tion would be lawful and not covered by the terms of the 
statute.209 
Although these cases present analytical diaculties under 
entrapment doctrine,zlo they demonstrate that the Court sees a 
relationship between unfair and deceptive government behav- 
202. 356 U.S. 369,373 (1958). 
203. Id. at 372. When the government entices an innocent person into 
crime, "stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the co- 
erced confession and the unlawful search." Id. 
204. Indeed, the language in some of the entrapment decisions characteriz- 
ing the government's behavior is reminiscent of the language used in Rochin, 
ie., conduct that is "shocking to the sense of justice," Sorrells v. United States, 
287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932), "abhorrent," id. at 449, and "lawless," Sherman v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurther, J., concurring), clearly 
suggesting that due process considerations are relevant, as they should be, in 
cases of excessive police involvement in crime. 
205. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 
438-39 (1959). 
206. 360 U.S. 423 (1959). 
207. Id. at 437-39. 
208. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
209. Id. at 568-71. For a discussion of whether Raleu and Cox are ~ r e d i -  
cated on entrapment, as opposed to estoppel principles,"see Note, mpra' note 
101, at 1046-51. 
210. The government did not disguise its official identity in either case, nor 
did ofEcials induce the aefendants to commit Ghat the defendants 
believed were criminal offenses. Moreover, in contrast with traditional entrap 
ment principles, the Court specifically found in Raley, and intimated in Cox, 
that there was no official intent to deceive. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 571; 
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 438. In Raley, however, the Court noted that "[tlhere 
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ior and the due process clause. The cases suggest, at least in 
theory, that certain "entrapment-like" practices might violate 
due process; yet in all of the foregoing opinions, because the 
Court found that the entrapment defense was valid, it had no 
occasion to rule on the validity of a due process analysis if the 
entrapment defense were unavailable. In United States v. Rus- 
sell, the Court faced the latter situation. The undercover agent 
in Russell Mtra ted  a drug ring, provided the conspirators with 
a key ingredient necessary for manufacturing the drug, and 
even participated in the manufacturing process.211 The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction be- 
cause, in its view, fundamental concepts of due process pro- 
tected against "an intolerable degree of governmental 
participation in [a] criminal enterprise" carried out by "over- 
zealous law enforcement."212 
Reversing the circuit court, a narrow majority of the 
Supreme Court believed that the questionable practices were 
justified. It reasoned that the government invaded no protected 
rights of the accused nor violated any laws.213 Moreover, the 
defendant's proclivity toward crime, essential to overcoming an 
entrapment defense, was conceded.214 The Court's passing ref- 
erence, in dictum, to the due process claim is significant. Spe- 
cifically citing the Rochin case, the Court announced: "[Wle 
may some day be presented with a situation in which the con- 
duct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due pro- 
cess principles would absolutely bar the government from 
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."2l5 The in- 
stant case, however, was "distinctly not of that breed."216 
Under this frequently quoted language in Rwsell,217 a judge 
was active misleading" by the government, implying that the defendants were 
not criminally predisposed but, on the contrary, law-abiding citizens. Id. 
211. 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972). See note 122 m p a  and accompanying 
text. 
212. Id. at 673-74. 
213. The Court noted that "the Government's conduct here violated no in- 
dependent constitutional right of the respondent. Nor did Shapiro violate any 
federal statute or rule or commit any crime in hflltrating the respondent's drug 
enterprise." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. 
214. Id. at 433. 
215. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added). 
216. Id. at 432. 
217. Post-Rzcssell decisions reviewing undercover police methods often refer 
to this dictum as a basis for invoking due process. See, e.g., United States v. 
Corcione, 592 F.2d 111,11415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United 
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Register, 496 
F.2d 1072,1081 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670,676 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 603 1981-1982 
604 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:567 
may find a due process violation if, in the judge's opinion, the 
government's conduct is sufficiently "outrageous." Thus, Rus- 
sell not only provided a more precise, albeit subjective test of 
due process in a case involving undercover police practices, it 
also intimated that a court may fhd a due process violation 
even if a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime and an 
entrapment defense is, therefore, unavailable. 
At first glance, the Court in Hampton v. United States ap- 
parently rejected the Russell dictum, and ruled that if the de- 
fendant cannot prove entrapment, there can be no due process 
violation.218 In Hampton, an undercover agent provided Hamp- 
ton with drugs which he then was induced to sell to other un- 
dercover agents. Although several lower courts found similar 
conduct repugnant enough to violate due process,"lg a bare ma- 
jority in Hampton upheld the conviction. The Court found first 
that entrapment was unavailable because the defendant con- 
ceded that he was predisposed,~o and, second, that due process 
was not implicated.221 The three Justices in the Hampton plu- 
rality appeared to conclude that a due process analysis is inap- 
plicable if a defendant is predisposed.222 The two concurring 
and the three dissenting Justices, however, seemed to endorse 
the use of a due process analysis in cases of very extreme gov- 
ernmental misconduct, even if the defendant is predisposed.223 
218. 425 U.S. 484,489-90 (1976). 
219. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Mc- 
Grath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), afd on remand, 
494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); 
United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. CaL 1970). 
220. 425 U.S. at 490. 
221. Id. at 490-91. Five Justices, including a three-Justice plurality consist- 
ing of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, and concur- 
rences from Justices Powell and Blackmun, found that due process was not 
violated. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, finding that due 
process was violated. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. 
222. Id. at 488-89. 
223. The concurring Justices rejected the view that due process is unavaila- 
ble if entrapment cannot be sustained because of the defendant's predisposi- 
tion. Referring to Judge Friendly's statement in United States v. Archer, 486 
F.2d 670,676-77 (2d Cir. 1973), that it would be "unthinkable" to pennit the gov- 
ernment, in effect, to join a gang of hoodlums and practice violence on innocent 
citizens, Justices Powell and Blackmun suggested that in a clear case of exces- 
sive government overinvolvement in crime, as perhaps in the Archer case, due 
process could bar prosecution. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 493 (Pow- 
ell, J., concurring). The concurring Justices recognized the doctrinal and prac- 
tical ditficulties in defining the limits of police involvement in crime when 
predisposition is not an issue. Id. at 494-95 n.6. Nevertheless, they noted that 
judgments of fairness and the identification of appropriate standards of police 
behavior are implicit in the concept of judicial review, and must be made even 
if predisposition is conceded. Id. at 495. Cases in which proof of predisposition 
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Thus, the Supreme Court seems to allow defendants to 
prove a due process violation despite their concession that they 
cannot establish entrapment. This result is necessary to guard 
adequately against governmental overreaching. The appropri- 
ate test, however, is the subjective test that the Court endorsed 
in Russell. As noted above,224 such a test is vague, leads to un- 
predictable results, and gives little guidance to courts facing 
similar situations in the future. 
2. The Lower Courts 
a. Contraband Cases 
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply detailed 
due process limitations to police conduct, some recent lower 
court decisions present a more sophisticated analytical frame- 
work by which to measure, under the due process clause, the 
permissible limits of government investigation. In People v. 
Isaacson,225 the police arrested a heavy drug user named 
Breniman for possession of narcotics, and used physical force 
and the threat of prosecution to coerce him into participating in 
an undercover investigation, even though the police knew, but 
did not reveal, that the capsules he had possessed were not 
narcotic substances. Under this compulsion, Breniman tele- 
phoned an acquaintance, Isaacson, to beg for drugs to finance 
his legal fees. Breniman telephoned the reluctant Isaacson 
seven times, sobbing and pleading, before Isaacson finally 
is not dispositive "will be rare." Id. at 495 n.7. Moreover, "[plolice overinvolve- 
ment in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness 
before it could bar conviction." Id. 
The dissenting opinions in Russell and Hampton would have invoked both 
due process and the minority approach to entrapment to reverse the convic- 
tions. Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, if one combines the 
concurrence's endorsement of the Russell dictum and the dissent's willingness 
to invoke due process, it seems fair to conclude that a majority of the Supreme 
Court views due process as a permissible means of controlling certain outra- 
geous kinds of undercover activities, even if entrapment is inapplicable. 
As one might imagine, however, the Hampton decision plainly has had an 
inhibiting effect on lower federal courts that earlier had relied on due process 
to bar prosecutions. Courts that had invoked due process reversed themselves, 
United States v. McGrath, 494 F2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974), and routinely afBrmed 
subsequent convictions raising colorable due process claims on appeal. See, 
e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F2d 111 (2d Cir.), c& denied, 440 U.S. 975 
(1979); United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); 
United States v. Smith, 538 F2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Register, 
496 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974). 
224. See notes 183-98 supra and accompanying text. 
225. 44 N.Y.2d 511,378 N.E.2d 78,406 N.Y.SBd 714 (1978). 
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agreed to provide Breniman with cocaine.226 At the trial, the 
defendant's entrapment claim was rejected because he had not 
proved lack of predisposition. He was then convicted. 
Branding the police conduct "inexplicable" and "reprehen- 
sible,"227 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that due pro- 
cess mandated dismissal of the indictment. Unlike the 
Supreme Court in Russell, the New York court did more than 
just characterize the government's conduct as "outrageous" 
without analyzing its conclusion. Instead, it isolated four fac- 
tors that, "viewed in totality," demonstrated "a brazen and con- 
tinuing pattern in disregard of fundamental rights."228 First, 
the court found that the police manufactured a crime that 
would not likely have occurred, rather than merely involving 
themselves in ongoing criminal activity.zz9 Second, the police 
engaged in serious misconduct "repugnant to a sense of jus- 
tice."230 Apart from the violence they practiced on Breniman, 
the refusal of the police to reveal that the capsules found on 
Breniman were innocuous substances was "deceptive, dishon- 
est and improper."Bl Third, the government engaged in persis- 
tent solicitation and appeals to sympathy to overcome 
defendant's reluctance.232 Fourth, the police demonstrated an 
overriding desire to obtain a conviction as an end in itself, with- 
out any indication of a desire to prevent further crime, for ex- 
ample, by cutting off the source of the narcotics.233 
These four factors are the same factors applied by a lower 
New York court in People v. Archer to find a staged arrest valid, 
and not violative of due process.234 As in that case, the four cri- 
teria were helpful in sorting out the facts to determine, in a 
more objective manner, whether the state's conduct was suf- 
ficiently flagrant to bar the prosecution. There may, however, 
be other factors, which this Article examines below,235 that 
would make the analysis even more complete. 
In another narcotics case in which the reversal of a convic- 
226. Id. at 516,378 N.E.2d at 80,406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. 
227. Id. at 514,378 N.E.2d at 79,406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
228. Id. at 523,378 N.E.2d at 84,406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
229. "[A] crime of this magnitude would not have occurred without active 
and insistent encouragement and instigation by the police and their agent!' Id. 
at 522,378 N.E.2d at 83434,406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
230. Id. at 522,378 N.E.2d at 84,406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 522-23,378 N.E.2d at 84,406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
234. 68 A.D.2d 441,44647,417 N.Y.S.2d 507,511 (1979). See note 52 supra and 
accompanying text. 
235. See notes 388395 infra and accompanying text. 
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tion rested on due process grounds, the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, in United States v. Twigg,236 focused on the 
government's excessive involvement in the crime. In Twigg, as 
in Isaacson, the government enlisted the cooperation of a nar- 
cotics offender named Kubica to help apprehend other drug 
traffickers.237 The government set up and supplied the cherni- 
cal ingredients for a "speed laboratory." The defendants were 
brought into the operation for financial reasons. Otherwise, 
they played a minor role, and provided little assistance. As a 
result of their participation they were convicted of illegally 
manufacturing a controlled substance. 
The court of appeals *st determined that this was not a 
case of entrapment because the prosecution had sufficiently 
proved the defendants' predisposition.238 The court found, 
however, that the extent of the police immersion in the crime 
''was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as 
a matter of due process of law."239 The court distinguished 
Hampton, the Supreme Court case that did not find a due pro- 
cess violation in similar circumstances, on two grounds. Hamp- 
ton concerned an illegal sale rather than the illegal 
manufacture of drugs.240 Also, unlike Nampton, government 
agents in Twigg "conceived and contrived" the crime rather 
than simply supplying ingredients or the contraband itself.241 
In justifying its conclusion that there was a due process vi- 
olation, the court used the subjective test found in Russell and 
Hampton and found that the instant case reached "a demon- 
strable level of outrageousness."2~~ Yet the court also analyzed 
this conclusion in more detail, suggesting several factors that 
led to its holding. First, the defendants had no apparent crimi- 
nal designs, and they lacked the expertise to set up a labora- 
tory without government assistance.243 Moreover, the 
government initiated, established, and directed a criminal oper- 
.ation rather than investigating an existing narcotics labora- 
236. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
237. Kubica was arrested by federal agents in 1976 for illegally manufactur- 
ing drugs. He pleaded guilty to one felony count and received a four-year sen- 
tence. He previously had been convicted in state courts of similar charges. Id. 
at 375. 
238. Id. at 376. 
239. Id. at 377. 
240. The court noted that since selling drugs is "a much more fleeting and 
elusive crime to detect than the operation of an illicit drug laboratory," the gov- 
ernment is required to use "more extreme methods of investigation." Id. at 378. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 380. 
243. Id. at 381 n.9. 
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tory.244 Finally, the government generated new crimes merely 
to press criminal charges.245 
- 
Isaacson and Twigg appear to be the only post-Russell 
cases involving contraband prosecutions that reversed convic- 
tions on due process grounds. In both cases, the courts at least 
attempted to go beyond Russell's broad standard. Although 
they are not complete in their analyses, they point out the di- 
rection toward which courts must proceed, and provide a guide 
for the development of more extensive standards.246 
b. Corruption Cases 
Two other reported cases in which courts have applied due 
process because of outrageous police conduct have involved 
prosecutions of defendants for official corruption. In United 
States v. Jannotti247--one of several cases resulting from an 
undercover operation popularly denominated "Abscam"-the 
trial judge set aside guilty verdicts on the grounds of entrap- 
ment and due process.248 In Jannotti, undercover FBI agents, 
assisted by a career swindler named Weinberg,249 disguised 
themselves as representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks who 
wished to invest huge sums of money in Philadelphia. In vari- 
ous meetings with the undercover investigators, Schwartz, the 
President of the Philadelphia City Council, and Jannotti, a 
member of the Council, assured them that they would solve 
any problems that arose in connection with the sheik's propos- 
als. In return, the agents insisted, over Schwartz's and Jan- 
notti's protests, that they accept large sums of cash, 
threatening to withdraw their offer if the city officials refused. 
Thus, Schwartz received $30,000 and Jannotti received $10,000 
cash, which, under the jury's findings, were bribes for guaran- 
teeing the officials' support. 
The court concluded that the defendants proved entrap- 
ment as a matter of law, and that the government violated due 
process. In its rebuttal of the entrapment defense, the govern- 
ment's only proof of the defendantsy predisposition was their 
244. Id. at 381. 
245. Id. 
246. See notes 264-388 infia and accompanying text. 
247. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (ED. Pa. 1980), rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 
1982). 
248. Id. at 1205. 
249. The court described Weinberg as the "archetypical amoral fast-buck 
artist." Id. at 1193. He had agreed to cooperate with the government when 
faced with a substantial prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Id. 
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acceptance of the money.250 The court held that this proof was 
ins~1ilIcient.z51 First, the cash amounts were "exceedingly gen- 
erous," constituting a "substantial temptation to a first offense." 
Second, the agents did not ask or expect the defendants to do 
anything improper on behalf of the hotel venture. Third, the 
agents led the defendants to believe that, if they did not accept 
the money, the project would not come to Philadelphia. In 
short, "the governmental inducement . . . was calculated to 
overwhelm."252 
This "governmental overreaching" also violated due pro- 
cess. Unlike the court in Laacson, and to a lesser extent the 
court in Twigg, the Jannotti court did not present a very de- 
tailed explanation of the factors involved in its conclusions. In- 
stead, it used more general criticisms, claiming that the 
government's techniques went far beyond the necessities of le- 
gitimate law enforcement. While the court conceded that it 
would be permissible for government agents to set up an un- 
dercover business entity, and to "hint" that corrupt overtures 
"would be welcome," it was neither necessary nor appropriate 
to add further incentives "virtually amounting to an appeal to 
civic duty."253 
The district court's ruling in Jannotti was reversed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.254 Recognizing the 
jury's unusual opportunity to view the defendants' acts on 
videotape, the court held that a reasonable jury could find pre- 
disposition in the minds of Jannotti and Schwartz.255 The court 
of appeals also overturned the due process ruling, but, as with 
the lower court opinion, provided little explanation of the due 
process criteria it employed. Distinguishing the Twigg case 
where "the government initiated and was actively involved in 
the operation of the criminal enterprise itself," the court rea- 
250. Id. at 1200. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 1204. As a further ground for invoking due process, the court, cit- 
ing United States v. Archer, argued that "the federal courts should not sanction 
the artificial federalization of purely state crimes." Id. Moreover, "it is surely 
not within the legitimate province of federal agents to embark upon a program 
of corrupting municipal offlcials, merely to demonstrate that it is possible." Id. 
at 1205. In a subsequent case also arising out of an "Abscam" prosecution, the 
district court took an approach contrary to that in Jannotti. In United States v. 
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1247-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), the court denied defendants' 
post trial motions to set aside their convictions on due process grounds. 
254. United States v. Janotti, No. 81-1020, (3d Cir. Feb. 11,1982), rev@ 501 F. 
Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
255. Id. 
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soned that the Abscam agents "merely created the fiction that 
[they] sought to buy the commodity-influence-that the de- 
fendants proclaimed they already possessed." This type of con- 
duct did not constitute the necessary "outrageousness."~56 
The only other recent decision barring prosecution on due 
process grounds concerns, appropriately enough, the staged ar- 
rest. In People v. Rao, discussed earlier,z57 the New York Ap- 
pellate Division condemned the prosecutor's use of the 
simulated arrest to investigate corruption, but refused to dis- 
miss perjury indictments arising from a related grand jury in- 
quiry.258 After the case was sent back to the lower court, the 
defendant was convicted of perjury. He then appealed his con- 
viction to the same court that earlier had condemned the inves- 
tigative procedure, yet had not held it violative of due process. 
This time the court reversed the conviction, and apparently 
overruled its prior decision, holding that the prosecutor had vi- 
olated due process. The court predicated its decision on two 
grounds: the manner in which the prosecutor obtained a per- 
jury indictment in the grand jury and the manufacturing of a 
fictitious crime. 
The court concluded that in obtaining the perjury indict- 
ments, the prosecutor had "befouled and besmirched" the crim- 
inal justice system by violating the attorney-client relationship, 
withholding exculpatory evidence from the grand jury, giving 
"erroneous, coercive and misleading instructions" to control 
the grand jury's determination, and asking numerous leading 
questions. The prosecutor allegedly committed these "trans- 
gressions" "to satiate his appetite for indictments."Zg 
The staged arrest, the court's other due process ground, 
provoked the court to even greater outrage. It characterized 
the procedure as "vigilante justice,"Z60 demonstrating the pros- 
ecutor's "undisguised contempt for the rule of law."z6l In its 
moral indignation, however, the court ignored its apparently 
controlling decision in Archer, in which the court upheld a 
staged arrest despite a due process challenge.za Since the 
Archer case sustained virtually the same investigative tech- 
256. Id. 
257. See note 80 supra; notes 61-79 supra and accompanying text. 
258. 73 A.D.2d 88, 90, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (1980). See text accompanying 
note 66 supra. 
259. 73 A.D.2d at 9697,425 N.Y.S2d at 127-28. 
260. Id. at 100,425 N.Y.SSd at 130. 
261. Id. at 96,425 N.Y.S.2d at 127. 
262. See text accompanying notes 48-60 supra. 
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nique found so offensive in Rao, however, the Rao court may 
have been concentrating on the prosecutor's aggravated mis- 
conduct before the grand jury, an occurence that was not pres? 
ent in Archer. 
More importantly, the Rao court ignored Archer's four cri- 
teria for evaluating due process.263 Instead, it employed the 
vague standards of Russell and Rochin and reacted to the pros- 
ecutor's actions because of a shocked judicial conscience. 
Thus, courts in subsequent cases are left only with a condem- 
nation of the particular practices in this situation, an inade- 
quate guide for cases that do not conform to these facts. 
V. THE RELEVANT CRITERIA IN A DUE PROCESS 
ADJUDICATION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
THE STAGED ARREST 
The preceding examination of the use of due process in un- 
dercover investigations reveals that courts generally will not 
hesitate to find a due process violation arising from a prosecu- 
tor's undercover activities. Unfortunately, the examination also 
reveals that most courts have adopted the substantive due pro- 
cess test, which vaguely describes a violation as conduct that 
individual judges find "outrageous." The Isaacson case, and to 
a lesser extent the Twigg case, stand out as attempts to dis- 
lodge the shocked judicial conscience test, and to establish in 
its place meaningful objective criteria by which to measure the 
lawfulness of police undercover tactics in general, and the 
staged arrest in particular. Using these criteria as guides, it is 
possible to formulate an objective due process analysis that 
will effectively curb prosecutorial bad faith, abuse, and excess 
in the undercover investigation of crime. 
This Article will divide its proposed due process criteria 
into two groups that represent two levels of analysis--one fo- 
cusing on ends, and the other focusing on means. The first 
level seeks to determine whether the government's ends are le- 
gitimate, that is, whether the government has a permissible 
and substantial law enforcement objective for its undercover 
investigation. The two factors contained in this group are the 
factual justification for the operation and the government's 
good faith. If these first-level factors reveal that the govern- 
ment's ends are legitimate, the court must then consider the 
second level. This level seeks to determine whether the gov- 
263. See text accompanying note 52 supra. 
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ernment's means were legitimate, that is, whether its under- 
cover investigative techniques were necessary and proper. The 
six factors contained in this group are the necessity of the oper- 
ation, the government's participation in the criminal activity, 
the nature of the government's solicitation, the social harm the 
undercover techniques might cause, the violation of individual 
rights, and the government's effort to minimize harmful 
consequences. 
1. Factual Justjcation 
Due process protects citizens against arbitrary government 
action. The government's arbitrary subjection of individuals to 
solicitation or surveillance, and its capricious temptation of 
persons to commit crimes for no other purpose than to obtain 
convictions, is the very sort of abuse that the due process 
clause is designed to curb. The court in United States v. 
Twigg264 felt that the dangers arising from the lack of a factual 
justification created a due process violation.265 Absent a factual 
predicate, government interference by undercover methods 
leads directly to a police state.266 
To illustrate the dangers of allowing the government to pro- 
ceed without a factual justification, consider the results of let- 
ting the government act on the basis of each of three merent  
levels of factual support. If the government bases its under- 
264. For a discussion of Twigg, see text accompanying notes 23443 supra. 
265. 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1973). The court found it "baffling" that the 
government made an arrangement to deal with a serious felon who mav have 
&I from 50 to 100 narcoticsiaboratories ''in exchange for the convictionsf two 
men with no amarent criminal designs. and without the exuertise reauired to 
set up a single iaboratory." Id. at 3gl n.9. One student co&entary suggests 
that the basis for the holding in W g g  was the government's lack of any factual 
predicate to investigate the defendants. See Note, Due Process Defme When 
Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. W. 1455 (1979). 
266. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), where Justice 
Brandeis said in dissent: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance 
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. . . . They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone--the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern- 
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em- 
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the [Constitution]. 
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747,762 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 265, at 
1471; Note, supra note 83, at 951; Comment, Tire Defense of Entrapment: A Plea 
fot Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 63, 80-81 (1967). 
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cover investigation on facts indicating present criminal activity, 
or suggesting that a particular individual is about to commit a 
crime,267 the government is not overreaching in m a t i v e l y  
soliciting particular groups or individuals; there is no danger of 
arbitrary prosecution. If the government bases its investigation 
on facts that indicate that official corruption exists, but that fail 
to identify particular individuals, the government does not vio- 
late due process as long as it does not actively target any par- 
ticular person. By providing a simulated opportunity for any 
potential offender to engage in the crime, or even by going fur- 
ther and "spreading the word" about the opportunity, as the 
agent did in United States v. Jannotti,268 the government does 
not actively interfere with a person's capacity to make an in- 
dependent decision. 
But if the government has no factual basis for its investiga- 
tion, the government violates due process if it approaches indi- 
viduals at random. The government would then be using 
intrusive and deceptive undercover weaponry to test the integ- 
rity or criminal propensities of citizens at large. This is deeply 
disturbing for several reasons. First, it constitutes a serious in- 
vasion into a person's privacy, and, once allowed, has bound- 
less potential as a tool of oppression and intimidation. In 
addition, subjecting citizens indiscriminately to a test of their 
integrity neither prevents crime nor aids in the detection of 
crime as much as it seduces into crime persons who are pliant 
and easily tempted.269 Finally, undercover integrity tests are 
inelllcient; they consume scarce resources whose more proper 
use lies in tracking down law breakers. Thus, law enforcement 
agencies should justify themselves not by the treacherous, 
bootstrapping practice of randomly approaching people, hoping 
that they will succumb to crime, but by the more painstaking 
effort to apprehend criminals. 
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate the re- 
quirement of factual justification, depending on the extent of 
its factual predicate. The government may possess specific in- 
formation that particular individuals are involved in corrupt ac- 
tivities, as in the first hypothetical situation, and not violate 
due process even if it deliberately solicits those individuals.270 
267. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
268. No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11,1982); see notes 247-256 supra and accompa- 
nying text. 
269. See notes 275-86 infia and accompanying text. 
270. This was the situation in both the A r c h  and Nigrone cases. In 
Archer, "federal prosecutors had been given abundant information about the 
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Or the government may possess information that supports a 
general suspicion of corruption, and not violate due process if it 
does not actively target particular people.271 If there is no in- 
formation of corruption, and the operation is used merely to 
test the integrity of random members of the court system, the 
staged arrest violates due process standards regardless of the 
degree to which it solicits particular individuals.272 
2. The Government's Good Faith 
This second criterion evaluates whether the government 
used the undercover investigative procedure in good faith, or 
more precisely, whether the government's assumed purpose in 
using the procedure is to investigate ongoing or anticipated 
crime to gather evidence of such wrongdoing or is, instead, to 
create a new crime simply for the sake of punishing the wrong- 
doer. Both Isaacson273 and Twigg274 used this criterion in find- 
ing a violation of due process. The question in analyzing the 
government's good faith is whether the investigative conduct 
demonstrates specific substantive law enforcement goals, such 
as the interdiction of the supply and distribution of narcotics, 
widespread fixing of cases in the Queens Country District Attorney's of8ce." 
486 F.2d 670,683 (2d Cir. 1973). In Nigrone, the court noted the existence of "al- 
legedly specific information about corruption!' 46 A.D.2d 343,344, 362 N.Y.S.2d 
513,514 (1974). 
271. This general suspicion can be based, for example, on suspicious rela- 
tionships between judges and attorneys, or on suspicious patterns of results in 
particular cases. 
272. The Offlce of the Attorney General of the United States recently issued 
. "guidelines" to federal investigative agencies engaged in criminal investiga- 
tions and undercover operations. The guidelines limit undercover operations of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation by prohibiting the agents, unless the Direc- 
tor of the Bureau otherwise approves, from offering inducements to individuals 
to engage in illegal activity unless "there is a reasonable indication, based on 
information developed through informants or other means, that the subject is 
engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activity of a similar 
type." See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE AT~ORNEY GENERAL, AIMR- 
NEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 14 (1981) (herein- 
. . 
after cited as GUIDELINES ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS). 
With respect to criminal invesaations ~enera1l.v. the rmidelines note that 
"individuals -and organizations shouid be frge from-iaw e&orcement scrutiny 
that is undertaken without a valid factual predicate and without a valid law en- 
forcement purpose." To this end, the guidelines authorize the opening of an in- 
vestigation only when there are facts or circumstances that '"reasonably 
indicate' " a federal criminal violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. 
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE AT~ORNEY GENERAL, THE AIMR- 
NEY GENERAL'S GUIDEUNES ON C m ~ t  INVESTIGATIONS OF I N D m u m  AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 3 (1980) (hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES ON CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS). 
273. See text accompanying note 233 supra. 
274. See text accompanying notes 244-45 supra. 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 614 1981-1982 
19821 STAGED ARRESTS 615 
or the gathering of evidence against a police official suspected 
of corruption. If the prosecution can identify such concrete 
goals, it would tend to negate bad faith. Absent such a concrete 
showing, a court should deem the procedure suspect. 
Of all the relevant due process criteria, illicit government 
motivation is the most subjective. Any inquiry into motive re- 
quires extremely difficult value judgments, and very delicate 
assessments of official acts. This difficulty is demonstrated in 
the district court's decision in United States v. Jannotti.275 
There the court found that the government's motivation was 
improper.276 The court agreed, however, that the undercover 
procedure was necessary, and the initiation of bribe overtures 
appropriate.277 The court also noted its "distress and disgust at 
the crass behavior" of the corrupt defendants revealed by the 
recorded and videotaped evidence.278 How, then, could the 
court conclude that the government's motivation was im- 
proper? Presumably, the governmental inducement was so 
overwhelming that it constituted an inordinate temptation for 
the defendants to become corrupt. And this inducement, the 
court believed, revealed the government's true purpose: to 
prove "not that the defendants were corrupt city officials, but 
that, exposed to strong temptation, they could be rendered cor- 
rupt."279 NO objective support for this conclusion existed; it 
was a subjective evaluation based on circumstantial evidence. 
Although cases like Jannotti, in which the government's 
motivation is not readily apparent, do occur, there are many 
other cases in which the government's bad or good faith is 
clearer. For example, if the government bargains with a seri- 
ous chronic offender to elicit his cooperation against persons 
not presently engaged in crime,280 or becomes both the defend- 
ant's supplier and purchaser of contraband, and refrains from 
investigating other potential sources of the defendant's sup- 
ply,28l the defendant has a compelling argument that the gov- 
ernment's true purpose is to create new crime, not to pursue 
legitimate law enforcement goals. On the other hand, if the 
275. See text accompanying notes 247-53 supra. 
276. 501 F. Supp. 1182,1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See text accompanying note 279 
infia. 
277. 501 F. Supp. at 1204. 
278. Id. at 1205. 
279. Id. at 1200. 
280. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Isaac- 
son, 44 N.Y.2d 511,378 N.E.2d 78,406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
281. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). 
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government carefully infiltrates an ongoing crime,z8z feigns in- 
terest in the defendant's criminal overtures to gain the defend- 
ant's confidence,283 or sets up a controlled operation that it 
believes will attract already existing criminals,284 the govern- 
ment's motive is clearly legitimate. It seeks to promote central 
law enforcement objectives: the prevention, detection, and 
prosecution of crime. 
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate this cri- 
terion also, depending on the government's motivation in using 
it. A court would have to evaluate all of the circumstances 
before making such a determination. In the Archer285 and 
Nigrone286 cases, interestingly, the courts did not dispute the 
prosecutors' good faith. In People v. Rao, however, the appel- 
late court denounced the prosecutor for contriving to "set up" 
the defendant for a perjury charge before the grand jury.287 In 
making this determination, courts should be aware of its sub- 
jective aspects, and require that concrete goals of law enforce- 
ment be identified before concluding that the government acted 
in good faith. 
1. Necessity for the Operation 
Even if the government's ends are legitimate, one must still 
justify the particular means that the government uses to 
achieve those ends. One factor in determining whether the 
government's investigative techniques violate due process is 
the necessity for using the undercover operation. If the investi- 
gative procedure is not necessary to achieve legitimate law en- 
forcement goals, its use may not be a proper exercise of 
government power, particularly if the deceptive techniques in- 
vade the privacy of the individual under investigation. In mak- 
ing such a determination, two questions are relevant: does the 
crime under investigation reasonably require use of undercover 
techniques or are less offensive alternative techniques avail- 
able; and is the investigative technique reasonably related to 
the investigative goals? 
One must first ask whether the undercover investigation is 
282. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
283. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
284 United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
285. 486 F.2d 670,683 (2d Cir. 1973). 
286. 46 A.D.2d 343,348,362 N.Y.S.2d 513,517 (1974). 
287. 73 A.D.2d 88, 98,425 N.Y.S.2d 122,129 (1980). See generally Gershman, 
supra note 72. 
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necessary or whether the government can obtain evidence of 
wrongdoing without infiltration or deceit. Certain crimes are 
readily discoverable with the use of less intrusive measures. 
Crimes of violence, for example, such as assault, robbery, bur- 
glary or rape, ordinarily are provable by testimonial evidence 
fiom complaining victims and eyewitnesses, as well as by tan- 
gible evidence, such as the proceeds of the crime or the instru- 
mentalities used in its commission. On the other hand, crimes 
conducted clandestinely and without complaining victims, nar- 
cotics crimes for example,288 frequently require investigators to 
use undercover techniques. If reasonable and less excessive 
nonundercover alternatives exist, however, courts may view 
the use of undercover techniques as an unnecessary abuse of 
power if they intrude into the private domain of the individ- 
ual.289 The 'least drastic alternative" test currently restricts 
other highly intrusive investigative procedures. In applying for 
an eavesdropping warrant to intercept verbal communications 
electronically, for example, a government official must certify 
that other investigative procedures have been tried and failed, 
appear unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous.z90 A 
similar consideration should apply in evaluating, under due 
process, the overall fairness of undercover techniques that also 
intrude heavily into people's lives. 
Assuming that undercover infiltration is necessary, one 
must then ask whether the particular undercover technique is 
reasonably related to the investigative goals. A particular un- 
dercover technique is not reasonably related if less extreme 
undercover techniques would be as effective in curbing the 
crime. In United States v. RwseZZz9l and Hampton v. United 
288. See note 13 supra and accompanying text; United States v. Rosner, 485 
F.2d 1213,1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). 
289. The Supreme Court has implicitly included consideration of the avail- 
able investigative alternatives in approving various undercover methods to ex- 
pose narcotic crimes. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the Court 
stated: "Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned 
to one of the only practicable means of detection: the a t r a t i o n  of drug rings 
and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices." Id. at 432. 
Moreover, "there are circumstances when the use of deceit is the only practica- 
ble law enforcement technique available!' Id. at 436. Similarly, in Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), Justice Powell noted in his concurring opin- 
ion: "One cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law enforce- 
ment authorities in dealing effectively with an expanding narcotics trafEc . . . . 
Enforcement offlcials therefore must be allowed flexibility adequate to counter 
effectively such criminal activity." Id. at 49596 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring). 
290. See 18 U.S.C. 8 2518(1) (c) (1976). See also C. F ' x s w a ~ ~ ,  WIRETAPPING 
AND EAVESDROPPING 118-28 (1978). 
291. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
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States,292 the Supreme Court approved fairly extreme under- 
cover methods as reasonably suited to the investigative objec- 
tive, interdicting the manufacture and distribution of narcotics. 
In United States v. Twigg, however, although not disputing the 
necessity of an undercover operation, the court of appeals 
sharply distinguished between the sale of illegal drugs, which 
"may require more extreme methods of investigation,"293 and a 
drug distribution conspiracy which is not as "fleeting and elu- 
sive [a] crime to detect," and presumably requires less ex- 
treme undercover methods.294 Similarly, the district court in 
United States v. Jannotti condoned the undercover technique 
used to expose municipal corruption-the establishment of 
fictitious business entities and the initiation of bribeszgsbut 
condemned the excessive nature of the bribe offers.296 In other 
words, although the undercover procedure was proper in the 
abstract, its implementation was so extreme that it violated due 
process. 
An investigation using a staged arrest satisfies this crite- 
rion because it is the only viable method of detecting judicial 
corruption. None of the appellate courts reviewing the propri- 
ety of the staged arrest, however, examined whether the proce- 
dure was necessary.297 This is surprising in view of the 
apparent necessity for the staged arrest. First, undercover 
techniques are necessary in uncovering and gathering evidence 
of corruption within the judicial system because no less offen- 
sive alternatives are available.298 Like narcotics violations, con- 
292. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
293. 588 F.2d 373,378 (3d Cir. 1978). 
294. Id. 
295. 501 F. Supp. 1182,1204 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
296. Id. 
297. The lower court in People v. Archer, however, did characterize the 
staged arrest as virtually "indispensable" to flushing out corruption in the judi- 
cial system. 177 N.YU., March 10, 1977, at  13 (Queens County N.Y. Sup. Ct.). 
The District Attorney of Kings County, whose grand jury was utilized to obtain 
the indictment in the fictitious case, stated in an aillmation that the staged ar- 
rest was "faithfully utilized . . . to promote the fair and legitimate interests of 
law enforcement." Record on Appeal at  206, In  re Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 
421,330 N.E.2d 45,369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). 
The New York State Bar Association formally requested permission to ffle 
a memorandum amicus curiae in the Court of Appeals in Nigrone v. Murtagh, 
46 k D 2 d  343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), endorsing the concept of staged arrest. 
The court denied the request on March 17,1975. 
298. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cerL de- 
nied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. DiSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 282 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971); PRESIDENT'S C O ~ S I O N  ON LAW EN- 
FORCEMENT AND ADI~~L~TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 198-99 (1967); Gershman, st(pra note 72, at  628 n.11. 
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spiracies to %" criminal cases, for example, produce no 
complaining victims. Moreover, ofEcial corruption does not pro- 
duce tangible evidence. Crimes such as bribery provide no tan- 
gible proof of past or present criminality, such as 
instrumentalities, contraband, or other visible evidence. The 
evidence of a corrupt judicial deal consists of an unheard con- 
versation, an unseen benefit, or a corrupt dismissal which offl- 
cial court records could not prove.299 Questioning witnesses, 
the one possible nonundercover technique that could reveal in- 
formation, would expose the investigation and alert the targets, 
who might then destroy the little available evidence, or collec- 
tively tailor their stories. 
Second, the staged arrest is reasonably related to the in- 
vestigative goals; less extreme undercover methods will not be 
effective. Just as the undercover agent needs to establish 'le- 
gitimacy" to gain the confidence of a narcotics ring, so does an 
undercover agent investigating the court system need to estab- 
lish his or her credentials. The only practical means to estab- 
lish these credentials is to pose as a real defendant seeking to 
purchase justice. Other investigative techniques, such as elec- 
tronic eavesdropping300 or visual surveillance, although of pos- 
sible use later in the investigation, cannot provide the initial 
base for launching the investigation. 
2. Government's Participation in Criminal Activity 
In infiltrating and gathering evidence of a criminal conspir- 
acy, or in providing a simulated opportunity for defendants to 
engage in crime, government agents often commit acts that 
would be subject to penal sanction if committed by private per- 
sons. An important criterion of due process is, therefore, the 
degree of governmental criminal activity that is permissible. 
One can divide the criminal activity that undercover tech- 
niques generate into two broad categories. The first category 
encompasses situations in which the government involves itself 
directly in the criminal operation under investigation. Typi- 
299. The court records would only reveal that the court arrived at the result 
asserted by the prosecutor, which is of limited probative value. 
300. Investigators probably could not use electronic eavesdropping, even if 
theoretically effective, if the information supporting the required warrant re- 
lated to conduct that occurred in the past. See C. FISH MAN^ supra note 290, at 
108-10. Whether information is too stale would depend on the facts of the case. 
Where the facts demonstrate a continuing course of criminal conduct, the pas- 
sage of time becomes less critical. See United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 
287 (loth Cir. 1972). 
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cally, the agents must engage in some form of contractual 
transaction-purchase or sale-to prosecute the wrongdoer. In 
most contraband cases, for example, undercover agents must 
purchase drugs, infiltrate a drug conspiracy, or involve them- 
selves in the manufacture or distribution process of an existing 
criminal ring. Or, in investigating a political machine, govern- 
ment agents might pose as corrupt persons and offer bribes. 
Although these acts technically could be considered crimes, 
courts conclude that they are not, either upon a law enforce- 
ment justification theory,sol or upon the theory that no crime 
has been committed because the agents lack felonious 
intent.302 
This category of criminal activity is a recognized considera- 
tion under due process.303 Excessive government involvement 
in the crime not only perverts the ends of law enforcement, as 
Justice Brandeis understood in his Olmstead dissent,304 it also 
may unfairly punish persons only peripherally involved in the 
crime,305 persons lured back into criminal behavior who had 
tried to reform,306 or persons easily susceptible to tempta- 
tion.307 The mcul ty  lies in determining the degree to which 
government involvement becomes so excessive that it violates 
due process. On the one hand, courts have held that govern- 
ment Wtration of a criminal operation, the temporary supply 
of essential items for its continued success, and the assumption 
of a major role in the operation's ongoing affairs do not consti- 
tute undue involvement.3o* On the other hand, the courts 
would hardly permit government agents to instigate muggings 
merely to convict members of a gang of hoodlums.3o9 Between 
these two extremes lies a broad spectrum of hypothetical cases 
in which it is not clear if due process is violated. One can iden- 
301. See note 57 supra. 
302. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de- 
nied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). But see United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 I?. Supp. 29, 
35 (D.D.C. 1974), a f d ,  546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 
(1977) (defendant was convicted of violating a citizen's fourth amendment 
rights). 
303. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1957); Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484,493 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
304. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. 
305. See United States v. Wgg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
306. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
307. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
308. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. Gonzalez, 
539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
309. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973), quoted in 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,493 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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tify, however, several considerations that might be helpful in 
making that determination: whether the government's involve- 
ment was of long duration; whether the government's involve- 
ment was direct and continuous; and whether the government's 
involvement was necessary for the continued success of the 
operation.310 
One consideration is worth separate emphasis: whether 
the government instigated and created the criminal operation. 
If the government actually initiates the crime as in Twigg,311 
Jannotti,312 and Isaacsor2,313 the question of the nature, extent, 
and duration of the government's involvement under a due pro- 
cess standard takes on critical significance. If the government's 
role is dominant and substantial, the court may view the gov- 
ernment as the actual perpetrator of the crime.314 This argu- 
ment is even stronger if, as in Twigg, the defendant lacks the 
310. In one extreme case involving violations of liquor regulations, Greene 
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit condemned as 
l'wholly impermissible" the participation of a government agent in establishing 
and sustaining a criminal operation for several years. An agent contacted two 
defendants with whom he had previously been involved in the production of 
bootleg alcohol and pressured them to re-establish operations. The agent's in- 
volvement was substantial: he offered to provide a still, a still site, still equip- 
ment, and an operator. He actually provided two thousand pounds of sugar at 
wholesale. The illicit operation lasted for three and one-half years. During this 
period, the government agent was the only customer, and he paid for the liquor 
with government funds. The court found entrapment inapplicable since the de- 
fendants had the predisposition to sell bootleg whiskey.- The court reversed 
nonetheless. saving L1lwlhen the Government permits itself to become en- 
meshed in &al-activity, from beginning to en& to the extent which appears 
here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment repugnant to 
American criminal justice are operative." Id at 787. 
311. See text accompanying notes 236-37 supra. 
312. See text accompanying note 249 supra. 
313. See text accompanying note 225 supra. 
314. In *gg, Janmtti, and Isaacson, the courts found the government's 
activities excessive enough to violate due process. By contrast, courts have 
been more reluctant to find a due process violation if the investigation infil- 
trates an ongoing crime. In several cases in which the government's involve- 
ment in the operation was substantial, the courts emphasized that the 
government penetrated an ongoing operation and assumed a role that the de- 
fendants expected it to play. Thus, where the government infiltrated a counter- 
feiting scheme and did the actual printing, the court found that since the 
defendant initiated the crime and directed the operation, the defendant could 
not rely on due process. United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030,1035 (8th Cir. 
1976). Similarly, courts have sustained several other cases of arguably exces- 
sive government involvement largely because the defendants were predis- 
posed, and because the government infiltrated an ongoing crime and merely 
lYacilitated" its operation. See, e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Gonzalez, 539 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Register, 496 F2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F2d 
1213 (2d Cir. 1973), cwt. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). 
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expertise, ability, or inclination to begin to carry out the crime 
without government assistance.315 But even if the government 
merely Wtrates  an ongoing crime, there must be a point at 
which its involvement becomes intolerable. It is disturbing to 
see government officials thoroughly and continuously involved 
in criminal operations, even if they are acting to gather evi- 
dence of criminality. A difficult balance is required. But in a 
close case, the wise judge may well conclude that it is "a less 
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Govern- 
ment should play an ignoble part."316 
The second broad category of governmental criminal activ- 
ity encompasses those situations in which the investigators are 
not directly involved in the crimes they are investigating. This 
category includes two subsections. One subsection includes 
those crimes committed by the government agent that are nec- 
essary to make the eventual criminal operation successful. In 
one case, for example,317 an undercover agent entered an estab- 
lishment suspected of gambling violations. To establish the le- 
gitimacy of his disguised role, he placed bets himself and was 
arrested. The conviction was reversed on the ground that the 
defendant lacked criminal intent. The other subsection in- 
cludes those crimes that are only marginally related to the 
criminal investigation, and independent of any crimes commit- 
ted by the defendant.318 In one narcotics case, for example, the 
defendant argued that the government's payment of the in- 
formant's living expenses violated the state's prostitution 
laws.319 
Courts generally condone the government's involvement in 
crimes included in the first subsection. As long as the crimes 
are reasonably necessary to carry out the investigation, the 
courts realize that these acts are justifiable and do not violate 
due process.320 Crimes included in the second subsection, how- 
315. 588 Fad 373,381 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978). 
316. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
317. ~ G t e  v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899). 
318. See. e.0.. United States v. Prairie. 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978): United 
States v. ~$v&,'508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), c& denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975ji United 
States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Owens, 
228 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1964). 
319. United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316.1319 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978). 
320. See, e.g., United ~tates.v. ~e~noso-IJiloa, 548 ~ 2 d  1329 (9th'~ir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Van Maanen, 547 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lue, 498 F2d 531 (9th 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 
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ever, have come under greater criticism since the government 
need not have committed the crime to gather its evidence 
against the defendant. Just as the government may not exces- 
sively enmesh itself in the criminal activity under investigation, 
so too must it refrain from unnecessary illegal activity. Al- 
though some courts have found such conduct irrelevant for due 
process purposes,321 others have found such conduct 
intolerable.322 
An investigation using a staged arrest meets this criterion. 
Although the government will likely commit crimes in both 
broad categories, it does not violate due process in doing so. Its 
agents commit a crime in the first category in dealing with judi- 
cial officials to arrange a "W' in the manufactured case, thus 
participating in the crime under investigation. As noted above, 
participation in this type of crime can violate due process if the 
government's involvement becomes too excessive.323 Yet 
staged arrests have not generally involved the agent-defendant 
in a significant role.324 Although the government manufactures 
the crime, its subsequent involvement is insubstantial and thus 
not objectionable. Moreover, in the aftermath of Russell and 
Hampton, the courts have been cautious in condemning as 
overinvolvement questionable undercover practices.325 This re- 
luctance, combined with the relatively limited governmental 
participation in the crime under investigation, renders this 
criminal behavior immune from a due process attack. 
The government's agents also are likely to commit crimes 
in the second category, crimes that are not the crimes being in- 
vestigated-in this instance acts of official corruption. In manu- 
facturing the staged arrest they may violate state law, for 
example, by filing false documents and false statements before 
U.S. 931 (1974); State v. Dingman, 232 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1950); People v. Joyce, 47 
AD.2d 562, 363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975); People v. Mills, 91 AD. 331, 86 N.Y.S. 529, 
afd, 178 N.Y. 274,70 N.E. 786 (1904); State v. Busscher, 81 Nev. 587,407 P.2d 715 
(1965). 
321. United States v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443 (10t6 Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), c a t  denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). 
322. United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United 
States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1964). 
323. See text accompanying notes 308-16 supra. 
324. In United States v. Archer, the three codefendants fabricated the 
agent's story and supervised its presentation to the jury. See text accompany- 
ing notes 27-33 supra. In Nigrone v. Murtagh, the agent's attorney prepared the 
agent's phony story and made all the arrangements for the fix See text accom- 
panying notes 63-65 supra. 
325. See Park, supra note 83, a t  189. 
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judges and juries.326 Although some courts have harshly con- 
demned these actions,327 other courts have noted that the com- 
mission of these technical crimes was justified as a reasonable 
exercise of the police power, and did not violate concepts of 
fairness.328 The latter position is more reasonable, since these 
crimes are not crimes independent of and unrelated to the de- 
fendant's illegal activities. They are necessary to make the 
eventual criminal operation successful. Moreover, although a 
court may castigate a prosecutor for lying to judges and grand 
jurors,329 the immorality of lying may be outweighed by the 
morality of exposing corruption in the judicial system.330 Thus, 
even though the government commits crimes in a staged arrest 
proceeding, the crimes are not excessive, nor are they unjusti- 
fied. As a result, a staged arrest meets this criterion of due 
process. 
3. Nature of the Solicitation 
Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[h] uman nature is 
weak enough and suEciently beset by temptations without gov- 
ernment adding to them and generating crime."331 As the 
Isaacson case demonstrates, government inducements can 
sometimes be offensive enough to violate due process.332 Over- 
zealous solicitations reveal law enforcement officers aggres- 
sively bent on pressuring citizens to commit a crime for law 
enforcement's sake, rather than as an incident to detecting and 
preventing ongoing crime. And the greater the government's 
pressure, the greater the possibility of luring into crime inno- 
cent persons not disposed to breaking the law. 
Solicitations vary considerably, as do the personalities of 
the people subject to their temptation. The predisposition test 
of entrapment333 often glosses over the varieties of induce- 
326. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
327. See text accompanying notes 3637,6668 supra. 
328. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. 
329. See text accompanying notes 3637,6668 supra. 
330. The subject of the morality of lying has generated an ongoing debate 
among philosophers. One school holds that lying is absolutely immoral, regard- 
less of the consequences. See L KANT, 'lb METAPWSIC OF ETHXCS 267 (1836). 
Opposed to this is the view that some lying is morally permissible where it has 
socially desirable consequences. See C. FRIED, RIGFIT AND WRONG 69-78 (1978); 
S. PUFENDORF, IV LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS w EIGHT BOOKS ch. 1, subch. 16 
(B. Kenneth trans. 1729). See generally S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUB- 
uc AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). 
331. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
332. See text accompanying notes 207,228-33 supra. 
333. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra. 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 624 1981-1982 
STAGED ARRESTS 
ments and dimensions of character, simplistically inquiring 
whether the defendant demonstrated a readiness and willing- 
ness to engage in crime. Under a due process test, however,. 
one ought to analyze the nature and extent of the inducement 
and the character of the person solicited, not to determine the 
defendant's inclination to crime but, rather, to determine the 
government's sense of fair play. Inducements might consist of, 
for example, simple requests,3= repeated and persistent re- 
quests,335 physical threats,336 promises of romantic involve- 
ment,337 promises of exorbitant gain,338 or appeals to 
sickness,339 sympathy,34 friendship, or pride.341 Persons sub- 
ject to the solicitations might include, for example, chronic of- 
fenders requiring very little inducement,3& prior offenders who 
may have decided to reform but are very susceptible to pres- 
sure,343 prior offenders who need more persuasion to return to 
crime,344 innocent people who are weak and vulnerable to 
temptation,M5 or innocent people who resolutely obey the law 
but might succumb to attractive inducements.34- Due process 
should limit those solicitations that are excessive in light of the 
type of individual they are directed toward, even though under 
the entrapment doctrine one could probably show 
predisposition.347 
Several courts have essentially used this criterion, holding 
that the government's solicitations were too extreme. In United 
States v. Jannotti, for instance, the district court found that the 
334. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
335. See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 
714 (1978). 
336. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1977). 
337. See, e.g., United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1981). 
338. See, e.g., United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). 
339. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
340. See, e.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1966). 
341. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 430 (1932). 
342. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1967). 
343. See, e.g., United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977). 
344, See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
345. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1977). 
346. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), 
rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982). 
347. The courts generally do not inquire into the subjective state of mind of 
the defendant in evaluating the defendant's predisposition. Rather, the inquiry 
usually relates to the promptness or willingness of the defendant to engage in 
the criminal activity. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. Thus, a de- 
fendant's weak will may likely cause the court to find predisposition, although 
the same weakness may be a signscant factor in finding that the government's 
solicitation was excessive. 
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nature and extent of the solicitations were so excessive that it 
violated principles of fairness under due process.348 The bribes 
were very large, the defendants were not requested to do any- 
thing improper, and the defendants were led to believe that if 
they did not accept the money, the project would not come to 
their city.349 Similarly, in People v. Isaacson, the court found 
that the solicitations were excessive, unfair, and explicitly a 
ground for reversal under due process.350 The informant made 
repeated telephone calls to the defendant, recalling their 
friendship and sobbing that he faced life imprisonment, that 
his parents and friends had abandoned him, and that he 
needed money to hire a lawyer and raise bail.351 
One should, however, view the nature of the solicitation 
and the other due process factors, just as the court did in Isaac- 
son, in conjunction with other aspects of the undercover opera- 
tion.352 Some solicitations by themselves might be egregious 
enough to violate due process.353 With others, it would be nec- 
essary to inquire into the nature of the transaction, the defend- 
ant's state of mind, and the government's conduct apart £rom 
the solicitation. 
An investigation using a staged arrest may be unduly intru- 
sive and, therefore, violate this criterion. Excessive and im- 
proper solicitations may occur in the course of the investigation 
after the initial crime has been contrived and sent into the jus- 
tice system. The government agents might be excessive in 
their entreaties of defense attorneys or others to help the 
agents escape the prosecutor's charges. As is the case under 
an objective entrapment test, such solicitations would be sub- 
ject to scrutiny under due process because of their capacity, as 
in Jannotti,354 to tempt into crime persons who otherwise 
would not likely break the law. 
4. Societal Harm 
Another important criterion under due process is whether 
348. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 
1982). See text accompanying notes 247-56 supra. 
349. See text accompanying note 252 supra. 
350. 44 N.Y.2d 511,378 N.E.2d 78,406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). See text accompa- 
nying notes 227-32 supra. 
351. See 44 N.Y.2d at 516,378 N.E.2d at 80,406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. 
352. See text accompanying notes 225-30 supra. 
353. Arguably this was the case in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 
(1958), in which the Court found entrapment as a matter of law. The Court, was 
not presented with a due process argument and did not discuss the issue. 
354. See text accompanying notes 250-52 supra. 
Heinonline - -  66 Minn. L. Rev. 626 1981-1982 
19821 STAGED ARRESTS 627 
the undercover activity produced concrete social harm. Under- 
cover conduct that causes or threatens harm to innocent per- 
sons or institutions is totally alien to proper police functions. 
Paraphrasing Judge Friendly's pronouncement in United States 
v. Archer, it would be unthinkable for government agents to in- 
Altrate a gang of juveniles and perpetrate rapes to gather evi- 
dence for prosecution.355 Such conduct not only constitutes an 
intolerable participation in crime, but also involves unneces- 
sary and gratuitous harm to society. There is absolutely no law 
enforcement justification for such conduct, and government 
techniques that cause or threaten such harm implicate due 
process. 
With few exceptions, courts have failed to notice or to eval- 
uate the social harm that undercover investigations cause. In 
United States v. Russell, a government agent supplied a drug 
manufacturing ring with an essential ingredient for producing 
drugs.356 The government permitted the ring to manufacture 
and distribute the drugs into society for over a month before 
making arrests.357 This use of government power to aid and 
abet the dissemination of drugs that could have resulted in se- 
rious injury to citizens was improper. By contrast, if the under- 
cover agents purchase contraband, but do not sell it, they 
obviate the possibility of harm to society.358 Also, no harm 
would result if, in a case like Russell, the government agent 
purchased or recovered the manufactured drugs so that they 
could not reach channels of commerce.359 
Other cases have involved real and tangible social harm 
that the courts did not adequately address. In one case, for ex- 
ample, a government agent joined a burglary ring, stood by as a 
burglary proceeded in his presence, and then helped to dispose 
of the proceeds.360 In another case, government agents, in vio- 
lation of state game laws, killed animals in concert with the de- 
fendants.361 In yet another case, government agents sat by 
355. 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973). 
356. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra. 
357. See text accompanying note 122 supra. 
358. Thus, a case such as Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)' 
causes less societal harm than Russell, even though the government's conduct 
may be subject to criticism for other reasons. See text accompanying notes 125- 
26 supra. 
359. See United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (government 
agents handed over illicitly manufactured drugs to federal drug enforcement 
agency on pretext of placing drugs in safety deposit box). 
360. People v. Joyce, 47 k D 2 d  562,363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975). 
361. United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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while people extorted money to induce official action, knowing 
that those officials would retain the money for their own use.362 
These cases do not cause the level of harm that government 
brutality or threats of physical violence to innocent persons 
cause; however, they isolate another factor pertinent to due 
process. 
Although an investigation using a staged arrest may cause 
some societal harm, the degree of this harm is small enough 
not to invalidate the investigation on due process grounds. 
Certainly there is no tangible harm to society; narcotics are not 
being disseminated, nor are lives or property being injured. 
The staged arrest might, however, affect the public's confidence 
in the impartiality of its judicial institutions. In addition, by in- 
jecting a sham case into the court system, falsifying court pa- 
pers, and lying to judges and grand jurors, the government 
investigators threaten the integrity of these institutions by 
making them unwitting accomplices in the investigation, and 
by demonstrating contempt for procedures and safeguards cre- 
ated for the legitimate resolution of disputes. Yet it is common 
knowledge that prosecutors often use the court system's rules 
and procedures, particularly the grand jury, to further the in- 
terests of law enforcement, even though this decreases the 
public's confidence in the courts' impartiality.363 Moreover, if 
those same institutions are tainted with corruption, and justice 
is a purchasable commodity, then it is likely that the public al- 
ready holds the legal system in contempt and would welcome 
the staged arrest as a needed antidote. 
The use of fictitious court proceedings and the grand jury 
to establish the credentials of undercover agents in preparation 
for the exposure of corruption does not, therefore, appear in- 
herently evil or improper. The staged arrest undoubtedly af- 
fects the publicly perceived integrity or impartiality of the 
system to some extent. But one must balance this nebulous 
harm against the benefits derived from eradicating misconduct 
from that system. This admittedly is difficult to resolve objec- 
tively. On balance, however, this relatively small harm should 
not alone violate due process.364 
362. United States v. DiSapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
U.S. 999 (1971). 
363. See note 72 supra. 
364. Of course, this societal harm could combine with other adverse factors, 
causing a staged arrest to violate due process. This possibility is a strong rea- 
son to adopt the preventative due process safeguards discussed below. See 
notes 389-412 infia and accompanying text. 
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5. Violation of Individual Rights 
Undercover police practices that deliberately violate an in- 
dividual's rights inescapably implicate due process.365 Al- 
though government officials involved in an undercover 
investigation might be justified in engaging in technically crimi- 
nal conduct to establish their credentials and to further their 
investigative role,366 there can be no justification for the know- 
ing and deliberate violation of the rights of individuals. 
It is clear that the government's infringement of the pro- 
tected rights of the defendant automatically invokes due pro- 
cess limitations.367 One court, for example, held that the 
government violated a defendant's rights, and thus violated due 
process, by abducting and torturing him.368 Similarly, a court 
concluded that due process and other constitutional protections 
applied when the government forcibly invaded the suspect's 
body.369 A difl[icult question arises, however, if the undercover 
activity invades the rights of a third party, not the rights of the 
defendant. Ordinarily, rights are personal, and only the person 
aggrieved may claim a violation of those rights.370 The govern- 
ment's violation of the rights of a third party, however, ought to 
be a relevant consideration in assessing, under due process, the 
overall fairness of the investigative conduct. 
The New York Court of Appeals adopted this approach in 
People v. Isaacson.371 The defendant in Isaacson did not con- 
tend that the government infringed his personal rights. The 
proof showed, however, that to elicit the cooperation of the 
third party informant, the police beat, kicked, and threatened 
to shoot him. The police also cruelly deceived him by apprising 
him, falsely, that he faced a long prison term.372 The court 
found this treatment repugnant enough to be a principal factor 
in its decision to reverse the defendant's conviction on state 
due process grounds. Although the defendant's rights were not 
violated, the court believed that countenancing such conduct 
365. See text accompanying notes 178-200 supra. 
366. See text accompanying notes 357-364 supra. 
367. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) ("The limitations of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defend- 
ant.") (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original); United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423,435 (1973). 
368. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
369. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1957). 
370. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,143 (1978). 
371. 44 N.Y.2d 511,378 N.E.2d 78,406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
372. Id. at 515,378 N.E.2d at 79,406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
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would condone police brutality and suggest that the end justi- 
fies the means.373 
The Isaacson court's approach contrasts with the Supreme 
Court's approach in United States v. Payner.374 In Payner, an 
investigation by the Internal Revenue Service focused on a par- 
ticular bank. Learning that an executive of this bank, an inno- 
cent third party, carried important documents in his briefcase, 
government agents devised an illegal scheme in which they en- 
tered the bank executive's private room, seized the briefcase, 
searched it, and copied several hundred documents. One of the 
copied documents was critical in the prosecution of the defend- 
ant for falsifying his income tax return. The federal district 
court suppressed the seized evidence under its supervisory 
powers, but also found that the government violated due pro- 
cess, concluding that the government "knowingly and purpose- 
fully obtained the briefcase materials with bad faith hostility 
toward the strictures imposed on their activities by the 
Constitution."375 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the two grounds for 
the district court's decision. It concluded that the supervisory 
power concept did "not authorize a federal court to suppress 
otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized 
unlawfully from a third party not before the court."376 More 
importantly, although the Court did not dispute that the unlaw- 
ful briefcase search may have violated fundamental fairness if 
conducted against the defendant,377 the Court found due pro- 
cess did not protect the third party because "the limitations of 
the Due Process Clause . . . come into play only when the Gov- 
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of 
the defendantT378 
373. Id. at 522,378 N.E.2d at 84 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
374. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
375. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,130 (E.D. Ohio) (emphasis in 
original), affdper curium, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
The court explicitly found that the government aflbmatively counseled its 
agents that the fourth amendment standing limitation permitted them to delib- 
erately conduct an unconstitutional search against persons to secure evidence 
against the real targets of the investigation. 434 F. Supp. at 132-33. 
376. 447 U.S. at 735. In light of United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), 
and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), it does not appear that the 
supervisory power concept is distinct from due process, at least in terms of un- 
dercover investigative conduct. For cases discussing the supervisory power 
concept, see Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 
318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
377. 447 U.S. at 737 n9. 
378. Id. 
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Notwithstanding this language, one may still conclude that 
the violation of an individual's rights, including the rights of a 
third party, should be a significant factor in evaluating, under 
due process, the propriety of the government's conduct. By it- 
self, this factor is not dispositive in federal courts, as the 
Payner case suggests. But state courts can certainly consider 
the violation of a third party's rights as a due process criterion 
under their state constitutions.379 Moreover, one may argue 
that Payner allows even federal courts to consider the violation 
of a third party's rights if other factors, as in Isaacson, contrib- 
ute to the due process violation. Combined with other exces- 
sive actions, such conduct may then render investigative 
methods so egregious as to violate principles of fairness. 
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate individ- 
ual rights and thus meet this criterion. Rights could be in- 
fringed in the implementation of the staged arrest, as in any 
other investigative operation. Violations of individual rights 
did not occur in the Archer or Nigrone cases,380 however, and 
such violations need not be, and should not be, a part of a 
staged arrest plan. 
6. Minimization of H a m  
In evaluating whether the government violated due pro- 
cess, one should consider its attempts to limit harmful conse- 
quences to societal and to individual rights, because such 
attempts shed light on the fairness of the procedure and the 
motives of the government agency.381 This is not to say that 
the failure to minimize potentially adverse social consequences 
necessarily suggests improper conduct or bad faith. Rather, it 
suggests that affirmative attempts to minimize harm might al- 
lay criticism of the operation based on other due process fac- 
tors. Although far from dispositive, minimization of harm can 
be another useful tool for analytical purposes. 
Congress has endorsed this principle by enacting a statute 
requiring government officials to minimize the potential harm 
379. See, e.g., note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
380. See text accompanying notes 24-79 supra. 
381. The United States Attorney General's ofice has issued guidelines rec- 
ommending the principle of minimizing harm in undercover investigations. See 
GUIDELINES ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 272, at 3 ("Before employ- 
ing a technique, the FBI should consider whether the information could be ob- 
tained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means."); id. at 10, 12 
(need 'Yo minimize the risks of harm and intrusion;" FBI shall take reasonable . 
steps to minimize certain types of undercover activity). 
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to society or the rights of individuals in using one particularly 
intrusive investigative technique-electronic eavesdropping.382 
Congress intended to give law enforcement all of the essential 
tools to combat crime, but insisted that those tools be used 
carefully so that the government would not unnecessarily in- 
fringe upon the rights of individual privacy.383 Accordingly, 
when electronically monitoring conversations, law enforcement 
officials must refrain from intercepting and recording conversa- 
tions not related to their investigation.384 
In many other cases, the government is clearly able to min- 
imize the harm its operation might cause by using voluntary 
measures. For example, in one investigation in which the gov- 
ernment Mtra ted  a drug manufacturing ring and assisted in 
establishing and operating the laboratory, the government pre- 
vented the public distribution of the manufactured drugs by 
procuring them itself.385 Similarly, in United States v. Twigg, 
the government located its drug laboratory in a farmhouse in 
an isolated area because the defendant had announced that he 
intended to stand guard at the site with a loaded shotgun.386 
The government might conduct an investigation using a 
staged arrest in a manner preventing it from satisfying this cri- 
terion. Yet, there are many steps it could take to minimize the 
harms of a staged arrest. In People v. Archer, for example, offi- 
cials instructed the undercover agent not to record or transmit 
the proceedings mechanically before the grand jury, and to 
limit his testimony solely to the story concocted by defendant 
Klein.387 Moreover, the government claimed, and the court 
agreed, that it took affirmative steps to limit the deception of 
judges to the minimum extent necessary. Finally, the govern- 
ment communicated the plan to the Chief Judge of the highest 
court in New York State, thereby demonstrating candor and 
good faith. Another way in which the government could mini- 
mize harm in some instances would be not to proceed to the 
382. 18 U.S.C. $2518(5) (1976) requires that an eavesdropping warrant must 
"contain a provision that the authorization to intercept . . . shall be conducted 
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise 
subject to interception." 
383. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). See also C. FISHMAN, 
supra note 290, at 203. 
384. There is considerable judicial confusion over the concept of minimiza- 
tion in the area of wiretapping. See, e.g., C. FISHMAN, supra note 290, at 203-04 
385. United States v. Smith, 538 F2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976). 
386. 588 F.2d 373,386 n.12 (Adams, J., dissenting). 
387. 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (1979), afd, 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406 
N.E.2d 804,428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). 
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grand jury.388 
VI. PREVENTATIVE DUE PROCESS: A WARRANT FOR 
THE STAGED ARREST 
Although the entrapment doctrine cannot adequately pre- 
vent the abuses that might arise if the government uses staged 
arrests,389 courts could employ the due process criteria identi- 
fied above to condemn overly intrusive undercover investiga- 
tive practices. Yet even if these criteria were adopted, 
government officials might be reluctant to manufacture staged 
arrests because of their highly controversial nature.390 More- 
over, the criteria would operate only after the fact, and would 
not be able to prevent the possible harms fiom occurring. 
Thus, the most effective restraint on investigative excesses 
would not operate after the staged arrest operation was com- 
plete, but would operate before it began. It would allow the 
government to carry out only those investigations that are rea- 
sonable and proper, and would prohibit all others. 
Prosecutors have long been subject to one such restraint: 
the constitutional requirement of a warrant in advance of 
searches and seizures.391 This provision of the fourth amend- 
ment was designed to prevent arbitrary and unjustified govern- 
mental intrusions.392 It requires a "neutral and detached" 
388. Investigators could structure the case so that attempts to induce cor- 
rupt responses from court offlcials would occur prior to any grand jury presen- 
tation. Also, in some jurisdictions, a felony case could be processed by a 
"prosecutor's information" as opposed to a grand jury indictment. See N.Y. 
C m .  Fkoc. LAW 8 195.40 (McKinney 1974). 
389. See text accompanying notes 83-169 supra. 
390. Both the federal and state appellate courts in Archer and Nigrone 
soundly criticized the technique. See text accompanying notes 36-37,67 supra. 
391. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
392. Amsterdam, Perspectiues on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mmi. L. REV. 
349, 411 (1974). An "unjustified" search is a search that interferes with a per- 
son's security when there is no good reason to do so. An "arbitrary" search is 
an unregulated and general rummaging beyond the scope of the official's 
power. 
General warrants and writs of assistance that allowed arbitrary and indis- 
criminate searches and seizures were the "immediate evils that motivated the 
framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573,583 (1980). As the Supreme Court explained in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 
476 (1965): 
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those 
general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of 
the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assist- 
ance had given customs offlcials blanket authority to search where they 
pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws. They were 
denounced by James Otis as '%he worst instxument of arbitrary power, 
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles 
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magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to 
suspect that a crime is being or has been committed, rather 
than leaving that determination to a police officer "engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."393 
Also, the search warrant must describe the place that the of- 
ficers will search and the persons or things they will seize, so 
that the police do not have unlimited discretion in their 
investigation.394 
Thus, a properly detailed staged arrest warrant could pre- 
vent abuses in an investigation using a staged arrest just as the 
search warrant prevents abuses in police searches and 
seizures.395 Although one could not advocate their use on 
fourth amendment grounds, since staged arrests do not involve 
searches or seizures,396 there are other ways to establish staged 
arrest warrants. Legislatures could pass statutes mandating 
their use based on the legislatures' general police powers, or 
courts could mandate their use based either on common law or 
on constitutional grounds such as due process.397 
If government officials routinely applied for staged arrest 
warrants that set out their factual predicate, their investigative 
alternatives, the details of the manufactured crime and its pre- 
dicted progression through the judicial system, their solicita- 
tion methods, and their predicted involvement in the crime 
under investigation, the warrants would mitigate the abuses to 
of law, that ever was found in an En lish law book," because they % placed "the liberty of every man in the ands of every petty officer." 
Id. at 481-82. 
393. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,14 (1948). 
394. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
395. Others have suggested the use of investigative warrants in other con- 
texts. For example, an offlcial British report proposed that the police must ob- 
tain a warrant from a magistrate before soliciting a person to commit an 
offense. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE 
(Cmd. No. 3997) 42 (1929). For other proposals, see Comment, Present and Sug- 
gested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforce- 
ment, 41 U. Com. L. REV. 261, 283 (1969); Comment, The Applicability of the 
"New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed De- 
lineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. 
REV. 785 (1970); Domeuy, supra note 100. A task force report on organized 
crime also recommends that some form of judicial authorization circumscribe 
simulated offenses and false oaths. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN- 
IZED CRIME 52-53 (1976). 
396. See united ~ G t e s  v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1.16-17 (1968). 
397: It i~'~uestionab1e whether law enforcement agencies, as a practical 
matter, would seriously consider utilizing a warrant procedure in investigations 
unless legally required to do so. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police 
Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 203,215 11.16 (1975). 
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which staged arrests are prone. As noted above, staged arrests 
may not meet five of the due process criteria, depending on the 
circumstances: the government's factual justification,398 its 
good faith,399 the nature of its solicitation,400 the violation of in- 
dividual rights,Ml and the government's effort to minimize 
harmful consequences.402 
By requiring a factual predicate, a description of the inves- 
tigator's suspicions, and the facts underlying those suspicions, 
a warrant would not only ensure that the government's actions 
are not unjustified or arbitrary,403 but would also guarantee 
that the government acted on the basis of specific substantive 
law enforcement goals, and would thus negate an accusation 
that the government acted in bad faith.% To establish a suffi- 
cient factual justification, the prosecutor may, for example, re- 
veal general information about widespread fking of cases in a 
particular court, as in the Archer case,Ms or specific information 
that a particular government offlcial has acted corruptly, as in 
the Nigrone case.406 A longstanding pattern of questionable de- 
cisions involving the same judges and lawyers might also suf- 
fice. By contrast, if an aflidavit recites only a generalized 
suspicion that government offlcials may be responsive to cor- 
rupt overtures, or otherwise discloses that the prosecutor 
wishes only to test the integrity of individuals at random, the 
court should swFftly veto the investigation. 
A description of the govenunent's solicitation plans that in- 
cludes the individuals whom it would approach and the induce- 
ments it would offer would give the magistrate an indication of 
whether the solicitation is excessive. For example, a plan to 
approach a judge with a bribe offer of $20,000 to dismiss a minor 
offense should be closely scrutinized. Similarly, a plan to im- 
portune repeatedly a defense attorney to suborn perjury also 
should be carefully examined. If not limited by some form of 
judicial oversight, such solicitations might lead persons not 
truly criminally disposed to commit crimes that they would 
-- 
- - - - 
398. see text accompanying notes 270-72 supra. 
399. See text accompanying notes 285-87 supra. 
400. See text accompanying note 354 supza. 
401. See text accompanying note 380 supra. 
402. See text accompanying notes 387-88 supra. 
403. See text accompanying notes 264-69 supra. 
404. See text accompanying notes 273-84 supra. In addition, by requiring an 
early statement of the crime the government wishes to investigate, the warrant 
diminishes the subjective element of this criterion. See id. 
405. See text accompanying notes 2426 supra. 
406. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra. 
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otherwise not commit.407 
If the government sets out the specific nature of its pro- 
posed opei-ation, giving detailed information as to where and 
when it will occur and whom it will involve, the magistrate 
could also determine whether the operation intrudes upon any 
individual's rights. For example, information indicating the 
government has used, or will have to use, undue force to per- 
suade an informant to participate in the staged arrest calls for 
judicial suspicion. 
Finally, by including the full details of the staged arrest 
plan, and by ensuring that the government's proposals are rea- 
sonable and proper, the warrant would require the government 
to minimize the social and individual harms that a staged ar- 
rest could produce. For instance, the government officials 
should provide the court with a careful and detailed description 
of the staged arrest plan and its implementation. They should 
apprise the magistrate of the crime they intend to simulate, the 
actors involved, and the likelihood of harm to persons or prop- 
erty. They should also disclose whether the plan contemplates 
false representations to judges or grand jurors or the use of 
false official documents. The court would then be able to deter- 
mine whether the government has acted in good faith in an at- 
tempt to minimize harmful consequences from the operation to 
the least amount necessary for the investigation's effectiveness. 
The warrant would not only work to prevent these five pos- 
sible abuses, it would also work to guarantee that the staged ar- 
rest would meet the three criteria described earlier: the 
necessity for the staged arrest,** the government's participa- 
tion in criminal activity,*g and the generation of social 
harms.410 
An analysis of the lack of available investigative alterna- 
tives would reassure the magistrate that the investigator must 
use the staged arrest technique to ferret out judicial corruption. 
The affidavit should explain that the only practicable way to de- 
tect the individuals suspected of corrupt acts is to fabricate a 
criminal case as bait for the suspected ''fix.'' It should articu- 
late the reasons why alternative investigative techniques would 
compromise the secrecy of the investigation, or woad require 
recruitment of public or private individuals with divided loyal- 
407. See text accompanying notes 331-51 supra. 
408. See text accompanying notes 297-300 supra. 
409. See text accompanying notes 32330 supra. 
410. See text accompanying notes 363-64 supra. 
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ties. Because such an undercover investigation is necessary,411 
given a factual justification for the operation, the magistrate 
should not be too hesitant in finding that the investigators have 
satisfied this requirement. 
As pointed out above, if the government sets forth, as re- 
quired, the crimes and the harm to society it may have to com- 
mit, the warrant encourages their minimization because the 
magistrate will veto any excessively harmful plan. This war- 
rant proposal thus guarantees, as far  as possible, that the five 
most easily implicated due process criteria are met. It also pro- 
vides even further assurances that the three criteria that 
staged arrest investigations probably meet are not violated. 
An investigative warrant is a controversial approach, and 
one not likely to be embraced by law enforcement officials un- 
less legally required. Nevertheless, if proposed investigative 
conduct involves extreme undercover methods of crime detec- 
tion or intrudes into sensitive areas of government, law en- 
forcement might wisely opt for some form of warrant 
procedure. Indeed, it is quite possible that in contrast to its 
condemnation in Nigrone, the Archer court sustained the gov- 
ernment's questionable tactics because the prosecutor submit- 
ted his official plan to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals 
in advance.412 This limited disclosure implied both good faith 
and recognition that the investigative technique demands justi- 
fication. Thus, judicial authorization should be employed to le- 
gitimize the prospective use of a staged arrest. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the principal judicial limits on 
the undercover investigative technique known as the staged ar- 
rest. The courts have vigorously condemned this technique as 
a flagrant example of law enforcement misconduct, and have 
only cautiously approved it as a necessary device to expose cor- 
ruption in the judicial system. Unquestionably, the frequent, 
unjustified, or arbitrary use of this procedure demands judicial 
control. But because the entrapment doctrine is generally inef- 
fective, the only available judicial control is due process. And 
given the courts' inadequate definition of due process, an ac- 
ceptable analysis requires the use of a more detailed set of cri- 
teria-as set forth above. These criteria, which provide 
effective postinvestigation control, in conjunction with the war- 
411. See notes 297-300 supra and accompanying text. 
412. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. 
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rant requirement, which provides effective preinvestigation 
control, eliminate the unattractive features of the staged arrest 
procedure, and create a viable method to detect and deter judi- 
cial corruption. 
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